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THE LANKAVATARA SL'TRA, AS A MAHAYANA 
TEXT IN ESPECIAL RELATION TO THE
TEACHING OF ZEN BUDDHISM
The Lankdvatdra Sutra1 is one of the nine principal Maha­
yana sutras in Nepalese Buddhism; in China and Japan it also 
occupies an important position in the philosophy of Mahayana 
Buddhism as containing the doctrine of Tathagata-garbha or 
Alaya-vijliana,2 and also in the literature of Zen Buddhism. 
The study of the sutra, however, owing to various reasons,3 has 
not been so vigorously prosecuted as that of other sutras such 
as the Saddharma-pzmdarika, Vimalaklrti, or Avatamsaka. This 
neglect has especially been the case on the part of the followers 
of Zen, whose traditional indifference to philosophy and the 
cognate subjects is notorious. One of the reasons is that its 
Chinese translations are somewhat difficult to understand, which 
is no doubt partly due to the same quality in the original.
There are three Chinese translations now extant ■ the earliest 
one which is recorded to have been made in 412 a.d. was lost so 
early as 700 when the fourth and last one was produced by 
Sikshananda and others. Of these three, the most difficult is 
that of Gunabhaclra which in all likelihood represents an earlier 
text, and it has been this too that has been studied most by Zen 
scholars and commented upon also chiefly by them. Since the 
publication of the Sanskrit text in 1923 by the late Dr Bunyu 
Nanjo, scholarly interest in the sutra has been revived to as 
certain extent in this country. It may not therefore be in­
opportune to discuss the significance of the Lankdvatdra Sutra 
generally as a Mahayana text, but especially as relating to the 
teaching of Zen Buddhism.
1 To be linguistically exact, this is to be roinanised Lahkavatcira, but
for practical reasons n is throughout printed « in this article.
- These two terms are explained below.
3 Of. the author’s Essays in Zen Bnrldliisni, p. 74 et seq.
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PART I
Breadth of Mahayana Buddhism
Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism so called, is like 
a vast ocean where all kinds of living beings are allowed to 
thrive in a most generous manner, almost verging on a chaos. 
Students who lightly step into it generally find it too complicated 
and overwhelming for their logical comprehension. But the 
fact is that Mahayanism is the outcome of long years of develop­
ment of a religious system among a people furnished with the 
most fertile imagination. The student has to be patient. The 
best method of study may probably be found by taking up one 
principal Mahayana sutra at a time, and by examining its con­
tents historically, philosophically, and psychologically. The 
Chinese scholars of Buddhism encountered the same difficulties 
centuries ago, and as in those days there was no higher or lower 
criticism of the sacred texts, every tradition was respected on its 
face value. The scholars exhausted their ingenuity to make a 
logical, humanly plausible arrangement among the literature 
brought over from India and claimed to have been delivered by 
the Buddha himself. Now this untenable position is abandoned, 
and each sutra has come to be studied historically, critically, 
and analytically. Each principal sutra may now be regarded 
as marking a certain stage or phase of development in the his­
tory of Mahayana Buddhism, which is indeed too huge and 
unwieldy to be handled as one solid piece of work completed 
within a few decades.
What does then the Lankdvatdra signify in the composite 
system of Mahayanism? What phase does it represent in the 
history of Buddhism? What in short is the message of the 
Lankdvatdra as we have it now? What function does it or did 
it perform in the conservation of Buddhist thought and ex­
perience ?
Each principal sutra has had its special work to accomplish 
in the unfoldment of the religious consciousness. For instance, 
the Saddharma-pundanka marks the epoch in the history of 
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Buddhism when Sakyamuni ceased to be conceived of as historical 
personage subject to the fates of all transient beings; for he is 
no more a human Buddha but one who lives through eternity 
for the benefit of all creatures. The Suvarnaprabhdsa, at least 
in part, also belongs to the same period. The Sukhavativyuha 
represents a stage in the history of Buddhist experience which 
ceased to be wholly satisfied with the intellectual presentation of 
the doctrine of enlightenment, when Buddhists began to be op­
pressed with the idea of sin hanging on them too heavily and too 
actutely. The Prajndpdramitd, on the other hand, dwelling on the 
conception of relativity seeks deliverance from the bondage of 
existence, or rather interprets the Buddhist realisation purely 
from the metaphysical point of view. The doctrine of Sunyata 
constituting the keynote of the Prajndpdramitd is really the 
foundation of all the Mahayana schools of Buddhism including 
even the Yogacara. What is known as primitive Buddhism 
denied the existence of a substantial ego (dtmari), but its con­
ception of the external world was that of the naive realist. 
The Prajnaparamita philosopher insists on the non-existence of 
a particular body as such, that is, as an entity whose indentity 
is absolute. Every being or every object, as he sees it, is 
relative, impermanent, and not worth getting attached to. This 
Prajnaparamita idea, of relativity, or emptiness as the literal 
sense of the term sunyata is, is the foundation of the Buddhist 
theory of nature. As to the Avatamsaka Sutra, it is really the 
consummation of Buddhist thought, Buddhist sentiment, and 
Buddhist experience. To my mind, no religious literature in 
the world can ever approach the grandeur of conception, the 
depths of feeling, and the gigantic scale of composition as at­
tained by this sutra. It is the eternal foundation of life from 
which no religious minds can turn back athirst or only partially 
satisfied. It is a great pity that this magnificent literature 
still remains concealed in a language not so universally acces­
sible. Not only deeply speculative minds find satisfaction here 
but humble spirits and heavily-oppressed hearts too will have 
their burdens lightened. Abstract truths are so concretely, so 
symbolically represented here, and one will finally come to the 
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realisation of the truth that even in a particle of dust the whole 
universe is seen reflected—not this visible universe only but a 
vast system of universes, conceivable by the highest mind only.
The Teaching of the Lankavatara
Where does the Lankavatara stand then?
The Lankavatara may be classed in a way with the Avatarit- 
saka inasmuch as it teaches the absolute idealism of the latter 
and is the disclosure of the inner mind of the Buddha, but it 
has a special message to give to the Buddhist world in a manner 
characteristic of the sutra. It is devoid of all symbolism—quite 
different in this respect from the Avatamsaka. It is instead 
straightforward in expression and notes down in a somewhat 
sketchy style almost all the important ideas belonging to the 
schools of Mahayana Buddhism. It is partly for this reason 
that the sutra requires a great deal of learning as well as insight 
to understand all the details thoroughly. The principal thesis 
of the Lankavatara may however be regarded as summarised 
in the following passage1.-
1 This is done mainly from the T'ang version, the Kokyoshoin edition 
of the Buddhist Tripitaka, VI, 87b f. Cf. the Sanskrit text (p. 42 ff.l. 
Throughout this paper, wherever pages are mentioned, unless no specifica­
tion is given, they refer to the Sanskrit text edited by B. Nanjo.
- As to the meaning of these terms, see below.
“Again, 0 Mahamati, there may be other Sramanas and 
Brahmans who hold the following views: that all things have 
no self-substance (nihsvabhava),'2 they are like a cloud, like a 
circle traced out by a revolving fire-brand, or like the air-castle 
of the Gandharvas; that they are unborn (anutpdda'), they 
are like maya, or mirage, or the moon in water, or a dream; 
that external objects are manifestations of the mind erroneously 
perceived due to false discrimination (vikalpa)2 since time im­
memorial ; that by thus viewing the world one ceases from being 
conditioned by the false discrimination worked out in one’s 
own mind, one does away with the terminology belonging to 
such false discrimination and with the signification of words 
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such as predicating and predicated; that when one understands 
that the body, property, and abiding place are the particular- 
isations of the Alaya-vijnana (or cftfcz==mind), one is freed 
from [ideas such as] perceived and perceiving, attains to a 
state of no-image, and has no thought of birth, abiding, and 
disappearance; and that all things start from the evolution of 
one’s own mind (svacifto). 0 Mahamati, such Bodhisattva- 
mahasattvas will before long realise the sameness of Saihsara 
and Nirvana.
‘ ‘ 0 Mahamati, by deeds of great love, skilful means (wpaya), 
and effortlessness (awa&Aoyacarya), a Bodhisattva reviews all 
beings and knows that they are like maya, they resemble 
shadows, they are not produced by causes; and further knowing 
that the world exists not outside the mind, he would lead a life 
of formlessness (nirabhasa). As he gradually goes up the 
higher stages, he will realise a state of Samadhi where he comes 
to the understanding that the triple world is mind-only (at ta­
rn, at r a). The Samadhi he has attained is called Maya-like 
(mdyopama). He will further free himself from all images, 
perfect his knowledge, and realise that things are unborn, and, 
entering upon the Samadhi called Vajravimbopama, will obtain 
the Buddha-body. He will, always abiding in the suchness of 
things, manifest himself in transformed bodies, he will be 
endowed with the ten powers, the six psychic faculties, and 
the tenfold self-mastery. 0 Mahamati, adorned with Upaya 
(means), he will visit- all the Buddha-lands; and disengaged 
from the philosophical doctrines as well as from the Citta, Manas, 
and Vijnana, he will experience a turning within himself and 
by degrees attain the Tathagata-body.
“Therefore, 0 Mahamati, if a Bodhisattva wishes to attain 
the Tathagata-body, he should keep himself away from the 
Skandhas, Dhatus, Ayatanas, Cittam, causation, works, discip­
line, birth, staying, and passing, and cease from discriminating, 
philosophising, and only abide in the thought of ‘mind-only’ 
(citta-matra).
“When the triple world is surveyed [by the Bodhisattva], 
he perceives that this existence is due to memory (vasana) 
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accumulated since tlie beginningless past, but wrongly inter­
preted. He recognises that Buddhahood is a state imageless, 
unborn, and to be inwardly experienced by oneself, when the 
mind gets fully controlled and purposeless deeds are accom­
plished. Like the cintamani (wish-gem), he will now manifest 
himself in a variety of forms according to the needs of sentient 
beings and lead them to the view that the mind-only is, and 
gradually have them go up the stages. Therefore, 0 Mahamati, 
let the Bodhisattva discipline himself well in the work of self­
realisation (svasiddhdnta). ’11
1 Being full of technical terms, the reader will find it difficult to 
understand, but as we go on the import of the passage here quoted will
I hope grow fully intelligible.
The All-importance of an Inner Realisation
The ideas that things are devoid of self-substance (svab- 
hdva), that is, they are empty in nature (sunya), that the world 
is nothing but mind, that in order to reach the ultimate end of 
Buddhahood one must transcend all the limitations of particu­
larity, and finally that the perfect state of enlightenment must 
be realised within oneself,—these are the common property of 
Mahayana Buddhism; but in the Lankavatdra these ideas are 
developed in a way peculiar to this sutra, as it lays its emphasis 
especially on the importance of self-realisation, without which 
the Buddhist life remains a mere philosophical exercise. The 
reason why Bodhi-Dharma handed this sutra over to Hui-Ide 
(®£pT) as containing the essence of Zen Buddhism must be 
sought in this that the constant refrain of the Lankavatdra is 
the all-importance of an inner perception (pratydtmagati') or 
self-realisation (svasiddhdnta'). Therefore, the purpose of the 
sutra is highly practical in spite of its abstract speculations.
In the first chapter which is added to in the two later 
translations of the Lankavatdra, we have this from the Buddha, 
who gently smiled looking at the palace of Lanka at Mount 
Malaya: “All the Buddhas of the past have discoursed on the 
truth of an inner realisation which can be attained only by the *I
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superior wisdom of the Buddha and never by the speculation of 
the philosopher1 or by the discipline of the Sravaka and the 
Pratyekabuddha. This truth I will now disclose for the benefit 
of Havana, king pf Lanka.”1 2
1 Tirtha, or tlrthakara in Sanskrit, and in Chinese.
2 P. 2.
3 P. 79 f.
And when the Bodhisattva Mahamati finished praising the 
virtues of the Buddha in the beginning of Chapter II, (which 
is Chapter I of the Sung translation), the Buddha surveying the 
assembly made this remark: “0 ye, sons of the victor, and 0 
thou, Mahamati, ask and I will talk to you concerning the 
attainment of the inmost realisation.”
These statements are conclusive to show that the Lankdva- 
tdra’s special importance in the literature of Mahayana Bud­
dhism lies in its perpetual reference to this intuitive element in 
all religion. While the sutra has been made use of to support 
the claims of a particular school such as the Yogacara or 
the Avatamsaka, in its connection with the doctrine of the 
Alaya-vij nana or Tathagata-garbha, this connection is acci­
dental; the thesis of the sutra must be regarded as centered on 
the idea of an inner perception of the deepest truth, which goes 
beyond language and reasoning. The Buddhist discipline or ex­
ercise {yoga) as is told by the Buddha3 consists of two parts, 
philosophical and practical. The philosophical discipline is to 
train the mind in absolute idealism and see that the world is 
mind, that there is in reality no becoming such as birth and 
death, and that no external things really exist; while the prac­
tical side is to attain an inner perception by means of superior 
knowledge {svapratydtmaryajndnddhigama). Putting the prac­
tical side of the Buddhist discipline first, we can say that when 
it is accomplished, the philosophical side follows by itself; that 
is to say, the world as seen in the light of self-realisation is to 
be interpreted in terms of absolute idealism. Whatever this be, 
the Lankdvatdra is decidely rich in deep mystical speculations.
One thing I wish to notice in the Lankdvatdra before I 
206 THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
proceed to describe the nature of the inner self-realisation, is 
that this sutra does not make one reference to the awakening 
of the thought of enlightenment (bodhi-cittotpada') made so 
much of, especially in the sutras of the Prajnaparamita group. 
The awakening of the thought of enlightenment means to take 
interest in the teaching of Mahayana Buddhism and to wish 
sincerely for the realisation of its truth. This is really the 
first step in the career of a Bodhisattva, for without this 
awakening no further progress in spiritual discipline will be 
possible. Therefore, in almost all the Mahayana sutras one is 
told to direct one’s thought first towards enlightenment. When 
this is accomplished, one can come some day to the final attain­
ment, however remote the day may be. In the Lankdvatdra no 
word is said about the awakening, but it goes directly to the 
heart of the matter, that is, it asks the Bodhisattva to come to 
the realisation at once, instead of making gradual advance 
towards the goal. In this respect, this sutra may be said to be 
an appeal to those Bodhisattvas who are already deeply steeped 
in the Mahayana teaching of the supreme enlightenment.
Another thing the student of the Lankdvatdra notices is 
that the Buddha here tells to attain to a state of inner realisa­
tion (.pratydtmagocara) and not of enlightenment (sambodhi). 
These two are psychologically the same process; when one has 
Pratyatmajnana one is enlightened. But in the Lankdvatdra 
the ultimate goal of the Buddhist life is generally stated in terms 
of experience (gocara') and not intellectually as illumining. I 
am inclined to think that the Lankdvatdra is unique in this 
respect explaining perhaps the reason why Bodhi-Dharma, the 
father of Zen Buddhism in China, recommended it to his 
mystic followers
The Inner Experience and Language
This inner perception or self-realisation is made possible by 
the presence of the Tathagata-garbha within the heart of every 
sentient being.1 The Garbha, literally meaning “womb,” or, 
1 P. 77, p. 222.
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better, “something interiorly hidden,” is the seed of Tathagata- 
hood from which a fully enlightened being grows up. This is 
however generally found covered up with the defiled wrappings 
of false judgment (parikalpa or vikalpa) and irrational attach­
ment (abhinivesa) ■ False judgment comes from not perceiving 
things as they are, yathabliutam, that is, as not subject to the 
principle of individuation, which is imposed by the mind upon 
things considered external; as to the irrational attachment which 
causes in us all kinds of vexation, it is the inevitable result of 
false judgment. The Garbha, therefore, originally pure and im­
maculate, must be restored to its natural state free from attach­
ments. It is thus generally likened to a priceless gem concealed 
under a soiled garment. Take the garment off and the shining 
stone will begin to shed its natural light over things as they are. 
The illumination thus obtained is a state of self-realisation, and 
one can then see the Garbha as if held in one’s own hand, even 
as plainly as the amalaka fruit.1 As the Garbha thus cleansed 
off its defilement is beyond speculations of the philosopher and 
the attainment of the Hinayanists, the author of the Dasabhu- 
mikar as well as the Lankavatara calls it avikalpa, or nirvikalpa 
(-jnana),1 23 meaning knowledge of non-judgment or non-discrim­
ination, a kind of direct perception, or again knowledge of 
thatness or suchness (tathatdjnana') 4
1 P. 222.
2 Edited by J. Rahder. P. 64.
3 P. 158, etc.
4 See also Sthiramati’s commentary on the TrimUka, by Vasubandhu, 
edited by Sylvain Levi, pp. 40-41.
In spite of the practical end it has in view the Lankavatara 
is filled with abstract nomenclature, which sometimes turns away 
those unfamiliar with Buddhist literature from further pursu­
ing their study of it. But this is unavoidable seeing that the 
experience on which the Lankavatara discourses is not within 
the reach of a consciousness ordinarily suffocated with contrary 
notions. The sutra is quite explicit in this respect as it declares 
that those who are tied (samsakti) to words do not understand 
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the truth (tattvam'),1 or that “the superior state of self-realisa­
tion is beyond speech and analysis.’’1 2 3 In fact, the Buddha is 
never tired in this sutra of repeatedly reminding us of 
the fact that language falls far too short of adequately repre­
senting the true state of self-realisation. This is in the nature 
of language. Language is always discriminative; when we make 
any reference to anything, this is to be distinguished from other 
things, thus limiting it to that extent and to that degree. But 
the supreme moment of self-realisation is not subject to any 
form of limitation and discrimination; perhaps the only way of 
describing it will be to say “that,” or, abstractly, “thatness” 
(tathata), but even this is discriminating, parikalpita, and dis­
torts the perception. As long as we are what we are, tied up to 
the exigencies of material existence, language is inevitable, and 
if we do not use words we have to resort to gestures or move­
ments of some parts of the body in one way or another. The 
Lankavatara remarks :8 Words are not necessarily used all over 
the world for the communication of ideas or feelings; for in some 
other Buddha-lands the Buddha-teaching is carried out by mere 
gazing, or by the contraction of the facial muscles, or by the 
raising of the eye-brows, by frowning or smiling, by clearing 
the throat, by the twinkling of an eye, by merely thinking, or 
by motion of some kind. Articulated speech is not an absolute 
necessity for human intercourse. Mere gazing is said to be 
sufficient in the world of Samantabhadra to make one realise the 
highest state of enlightenment known as “ Anutpattikadhar- 
makshanti. ”4 Even in this world, says the sutra, the ordinary 
business of life is carried on most successfully among the bees 
or ants that never use words. If so, we need not wonder at 
those Zen masters who merely raise a finger or utters an un­
intelligible cry in order to demonstrate the profoundest experi­
ence ever attainable by human consciousness. When there is 
1 P. 224.
2 P. 148.
3 P. 105.
4 This is explained below.
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nothing in my mincl which can readily respond to or which is 
already awakened to take in what is flashed out from another 
mind, the latter may use the finest expression possible in our 
language, and yet my mind may remain perfectly blind to its 
truth. If on the other hand there is a chord of harmony between 
the two, a touch' on either side will create a reverberation in the 
other. There is no power in a language as such, though we 
cannot dispense with it by any means.
The Lankavatdra here makes a distinction between words 
(rutam) and meaning (artha) / and advise us not to under­
stand meaning by merely depending upon words, to do which 
is quite ruinous to the comprehension of reality. Ruta (word) 
is the combination of sound and syllable, subject to our logical 
or intellectual understanding. (Vdg-akshara-samyoga-vikalpa.') 
It issues from the cavity of the mouth between the teeth, jaws, 
palates, tongue, and lips, when one is engaged in conversation; 
inflections, conjugations, and other grammatical and rhetorical 
modifications are effected according to the ideas (vikalpa) and 
innate desires (vasana)1 2 of the speaker. As to artha (meaning), 
it is an inner perception itself gained in self-realisation when 
one entering upon the path of Nirvana causes a turning (pard- 
vritti')3 in the deepest recesses of consciousness known as Alaya- 
vijnana. To gain this inner perception, a man retires into a 
1 P. 154, p. 193 ft’.
2 Vikalpa, literally means “to distinguish,” “to determine,” or “to 
discriminate,” and is rendered in Chinese by 5M!lJ/en-pie7i, which is the 
characteristic function of thinking. Vasana is a more difficult term imply­
ing the whole philosophy or psychology of Mahayana idealism. No Eng­
lish equivalent is found. In this article, “memory,” “habit-energy,” or 
‘ ‘ impression ’ ’ is rather loosely used for it. For fuller explanation however 
see below.
3 According to the T‘ang translation, “They [the Hinayanists] do 
not understand that great Nirvana is obtained when through an inner per­
ception there takes place a turning in the Alaya upon which depends the 
existence of an external world.” Vasubandhu’s Trimsilsavijnaptilsdrilsa, 
XXIX, also makes reference to this turning. The Lank avatar a, pp. 62, 10s, 
238, etc. More about this “turning” later.
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solitary spot all by himself, and, by applying himself assiduously 
to abstract meditations and deep reflections, his inner sense 
(prajna) or self-knowledge (svabuddh/i) begins to shine out from 
underneath the residual accumulation (vdsana) of the past 
thoughts, affections, and deeds since time immemorial. The 
meaning, artha, thus realised in one's inmost consciousness is 
something no combination of the physical organs is capable of 
expressing in any way adequate to the experience. But as when 
searching for an object in the dark one is to rely on a lantern, 
meaning is after all to be gathered by means of words, at least 
it is to be thus oriented. The understanding of the relation thus 
existing between ruta (words) and artha (meaning) will be 
necessary when we wish to know the nature of the inner percep­
tion (svapratydtmajndna).
This relation between words and meaning, or between 
syllables (jtkshara) and reality (taitvam or tatlidtvam)/ or 
between teaching (descma) and truth (siddlidnta)2 is like that 
between the finger and the moon.3 The finger is needed to point 
out the moon, but it ought not to be taken for the latter. The 
same disastrous result follows from regarding akshara, or ruta, 
or desand as the reality itself. Those who are not able to take 
their eyes away from the finger-tip will never realise the ultimate 
truth {paramartha) of things. It is again like feeding the baby 
with uncooked food,4 it will be too late to resuscitate it when it 
has succumbed to the mother’s unwise treatment. Those trained 
in the Buddhist doctrine ought to be quite discriminating in this 
respect. Naturally, we do not know what the teaching of the 
Buddha is if we have no communication in words, words are 
very much needed, but when there is no correspondence between 
words and meaning the teaching itself will lose its sense. The 
Lankavatara thus reiterates throughout the text that the Tatha- 
gata never teaches the Dharma fallen into mere talk (akshara- 
patita), and it was for this reason that it was preached by the
1 p. 48, p. 196.
2 p. 172.
3 p. 223, p. 196.
4 p. 196.
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Buddha and other teachers of the Dharma that “the Tathagata 
had not uttered a word in answer or in discourse” during his 
life-time between the Enlightenment and the Nirvana.1 The 
idea is, “Do not cling to words!” (Na d esand-rut a-patlie ’bliini- 
visatd m.)2
Words are to be treated like the lunar reflection in water as 
far as they are related to meaning. The reflection is there, 
though the moon itself has not entered (apravishtham) into the 
water; nor is it to be considered standing in no relation (nir- 
gatam') to the water, because the latter has something in it to 
reflect the moon.3 Only let us not fall into the habit of super­
ficially taking mere words for real meaning. This is the warning 
of the Lankdvatdra : Yathd-ruta-artha-abhinivesa-samdhau na 
prapateyuh.4
Disastrous Complications Arising from Discrimination
This habit of regarding words as completely and adequately 
expressing all that is to be found there comes from another habit 
of ours, which is, in the terminology of the Lankdvatdra, our 
wrong discrimination or interpretation (vikalpa) of the aspect 
of existence, which may be designated as individuation (pra- 
bliedanaya-laksliana? or vishaya-paricchecla-lakshana0). When 
this aspect is well understood so that we shall no more be misled 
by wrong interpretation, we are able to get into a state of self­
realisation. Individuation means to separate one object from 
another, and taking these separated, particular objects for final 
substances (svabhava, or dharma-dtmya-lakshana'), to cling to 
this notion, and to keep up one’s evil desires and passions burn­
ing all the time. According to the sutra, this wrong interpreta-
1 P. 144, p. 194, p. 240. The same idea is expressed in the Tatliagata- 
(juhya-sutra, which is quoted in Candrakirti’s Commentary on the Madliya- 
niika, B. T. Society edition, p. 201.
o p. 193.
3 p. 158, p. 193.
4 p. 160.
5 p. 127.
G p. 44.
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tion takes place in regard to several categories of thought and 
being such as (1) sounds, (2) describable objects of thought, (3) 
appearances, (3) material wealth, (5) substance, (6) causal rela­
tions, (7) definite philosophical views, (8) reasoning as to the 
existence of the ego, (9) coming into existence, (10) not coming 
into existence, (11) dependence, and (12) bondage and release.1 
Logically considered, this kind of classification is baffling; but 
when we survey the Indian background which stimulated the 
Buddhist philosopher to speculate on such conglomerate subjects, 
we can readily enter into his spirit. For Buddhists, in fact all 
Indian philosophers, there are no abstract problems of philosophy 
to be solved from the purely intellectual point of view. They 
are always tinged with religious sentiment, they have always 
some bearings on the most important practical question of life, 
which is how to get spiritual freedom. All the thinking carried 
on in this sutra, therefore, has always this question in view, and 
naturally those statements above referred to are to be explained 
according to the general trend of Buddhist thought.
The wrong consideration about sounds (1) creates an attach­
ment to musical or literary productions which are not always 
spiritually enhancing, and this is to be avoided. Objects of 
thought are describable and therefore determinable (2), but the 
content of the inner perception forming the central theme of the 
Lankdvatdra is not subject to this limitation, and if one gets a 
wrong idea here, there will be no salvation for him, as he takes 
a thing indescribable and inexpressible for a thing altogether 
contrary. Things describable have no permanency and con­
sequently no spiritual value, but we are liable to judge them 
wrongly and get firmly attached to them. (3) We are in this 
respect like those who fancy mere watery appearance in the 
desert for real one. This faulty judgment may extend in­
definitely over all appearances, and that the result is ruinous 
goes without saying. Hence this warning. Attachment to 
material wealth or property (arf7tff) is another case of false 
judgment as to appearance (4).
1 P. 128 et seq.
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Substance (svabhdva) means in the Lankdvatdra a concrete 
individual object, a residue after the last analysis; and the ad­
herents of the substance-theory maintain that there are really such 
things outside the mind (5). Owing to this misjudgment, the way 
to self-realisation is blocked. Errors of causal relation refer to 
the ideas of sat (to be) and asat (not to be), which are considered 
real as they make it possible to establish causal relationship 
between things about us (6). But this idea of causality ought 
not to lead us to a first cause or primary being from which all 
things derive their reality. As we know, Buddhist philosophy 
denies the first cause as really existing as such. The ideas of sat 
and asat are only relative and have no substantial existence 
besides being so named.
We next come to such philosophical views as entertained 
by different schools of thought at the time of the Lankavatara 
(9) ; according to which such categories as “to be” (asti) and 
“not to be” (na.sti), as oneness (ekatva') and otherness (an- 
yatva), or as bothness (ubhaya) and not-bothness (anubhaya), 
are actualities and for that reason adhered to. This is, however, 
wrong and sure to lead one away from the inner realisation of 
the truth. (8) Reasoning (yukti) is concerned with the notion 
of the ego; when this is thought to be reality, one’s spiritual 
development stops short. The Lankavatara, loyal to the tradi­
tional view of Buddhist philosophy, refuses to countenance the 
theory of ego-substance, which may be regarded as a corollary to 
general substance-theory. (9) The notion of utpacla (coming 
into existence) is related to that of causality. When such and 
such causes and conditions are matured, people think something 
comes into actual existence and continues to exist until the causes 
and conditions cease to operate; for coming into existence and 
vanishing from it are both real facts as much as is the law of 
causation. (10) The anutpacla view of things, on the other 
hand, argues that nothing has ever been brought into existence 
through causal relations, but that things are what they are even 
prior to the operation of the law of causation.
Dependence (sambancLlid) and bondage (bandha) are similar 
ideas. The relation between metal and wire is dependence, while
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a man tied with a chord is in bondage, from which he can later 
be released when the chord is broken. All such relations when 
adhered to as real ancl permanent become dangerous to the 
spiritual grow’th of a true Buddhist, that is, of a Bodhisattva, 
(11) and (12).
Words (rwtff) and meaning (artJia'), therefore, are to be 
separated, as the former generally fail to give us an exact idea 
of the object described with them. They are of course indicative 
suggesting where to look for the meaning. Numerous indeed 
are close attachments (abhinivesasamdhi') one makes to things 
and relations on account of a wrong understanding of their true 
nature and value, and, due to these close attachments, one wraps 
oneself up in a cocoon like the silkworm, binding tight not only 
oneself but others.1 Imaging things where they are not, or not 
perceiving them where they are, men are addicted to evil desires 
and passions. Let them only know7 how truthfully (yathabhil- 
tam) to look into the reality of things whereby to break through 
the nets of wrong judgments and false imaginations, and they 
would have an inward perception leading to emancipation.
The Meaning of Yathdbhutam, Maya, Sunya
To understand the world or oneself, yathabhutam, as it is 
in itself, is one of the great watchwords ringing through both 
Hinayana and Mahayana literature. But to know7 exactly what 
yathabhutam means is the problem, for it does not allow any 
definite description. The problem is to be settled only by ap­
pealing to direct perception when one knows what it is, as w’hen 
one sees a flow7er or a stone. In this respect, Buddhist termi­
nology is often graphic and full of power; think of such terms 
as tathatd (^n^n, or suchness), tattvam (&jW, thatness),
or satya being-so), which is used to designate the content
of inner perception (pratyatmajildna). This seeing yathd- 
bhutam constitutes the mystical element in all religion, and if 
one is affectively inclined, tat (that) will have to be taken in 
faith; but when the intellectual claim predominates, “that” will 
have to be perceived with “a noble eye of wisdom” (aryapra- 
i P. 161.
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jnacakshus') ancl not by a divine (cZivi/a) or human (mamsa) 
eye.1
The world seen through the divine or human eye is a world 
of mava, but one disclosed to the Prajfia is the real one. There­
fore, logically speaking, maya is not a quality objectively at­
tached to the world, it is not inherent in it, it rather belongs 
to the subject. As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not 
admit the existence of an external world, whatever qualities we 
ordinarily think as belonging to the latter’ are creations or con­
structions of our own mind. But if we allow ourselves to be 
guided by the discriminating imagination (pparikalpa), the world 
must be said to have in itself something of maya nature ■ for 
its impermanency is patent to us all, it appears and disappears 
like lightning, having no self-substance in it. To say that this 
is an evanescent world is to say that it is always becoming, 
never in a state of being, that is, in constant flux as an ancient 
philosopher aptly describes it. We must, however, be most care­
ful not to be carried away by the ordinary method of interpret­
ing the world and designate its transciency or constant becoming 
in the Mahayanistic terminology. This is highly coloured with 
idealistic tinge, and to apply it in an objective realistic sense 
will be quite misleading. When the world is said to be like 
maya, it is to be understood subjectively, and not objectively. 
Such objective terms as transciency or a flux of becoming pre­
suppose realism, and are not, strictly speaking, in harmony with 
the absolutely idealistic standpoint adopted by Mahayanists.
So with the conception of Sunyata (emptiness), we must 
bear in mind the fact that the term is not to be found in a 
logician’s dictionary, nor in one containing realistic terms only. 
For it is the word coined by the possessor of the Prajnacakshus 
(wisdom-eye) when he has reviewed the world as I look at a 
sheet of paper before me this very moment. By him the world 
is perceived yathabhutam stripped off all its logical predicates 
and also its so-called objective trappings; the world thus appear­
ing in its nakedness has been designated Sunya, empty, by the
1 P. 184.
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Mahayanists. It is in this sense, therefore, when they say that 
there is nothing substantial in the world, which is endowed with 
an ego (dtman), and, therefore, which can be taken hold of; or 
that it slips off one’s hands so readily, one predicate falling off 
after another, as it cannot be designated as being (sat), nor by 
its opposite, not-being (asat). No term or notion that admits an 
antithesis can be applied to the world, as it is beyond the logic 
of opposites. To mention some of such terms used in the Lan- 
kavatara, they are: asti and ndsti, or sat and asat, svalakshana 
and samanyalakshana, lakshya and lakshana, grdhya and grd- 
liana, samsdra and nirvana, bdhyan and adhyatmaka, anya and 
ananya, anekata and ekatd, ubhaya and nobhaya, nitya and 
anitya, etc. Before one term definitely fixes its quality, it runs 
over to the other alternative.
The Lankavatara, therefore, declares that the world as it is 
does not fall within the four propositions or points (catush- 
kotika)1, and in the first chapter even one hundred and eight 
negations are enumerated. The most truthful description of the 
state of things as we experience in this world of particulars, 
will be, from the Buddhist way of thinking, to compare it to 
maya as created by the magician.1 2 Making use of whatever 
objects he may take hold of, he would make out a variety of 
phantom creatures which appear to the spectators real. But in 
this neither the magician nor the objects fancifully created are 
at fault; the fault lies with the spectators who make erroneous 
judgments permitting things where they are not. The sutra 
gives further analogical proofs3 to impress upon us the truth 
of maya-conception or that of Sunyata. That a picture is seen 
as really having the three dimensions, that a bedimmed eye 
imagines a hair-net (kesondukam), that a circle traced out by 
a fire-brand in quick motion is considered real, that a bubble is 
taken for a crystal-ball, and, further, that the reflection of a 
tree in the lake, an image in the mirror, an echo reverberating 
1 They are: affirmation, negation, double affirmation, and double 
negation.
2 P. 56, p. 109, pp. 129-130, p. 199, etc.
3 P. SO, ft, etc.
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through the valley, a mirage in the spring-field, and the wooden 
man operated by a pisaca—that each of these phenomena is 
regarded as an actuality, is due to the error of judgment on the 
part of an unenlightened mind, which, being placed under the 
permeating influence (vctsand') of the past thoughts and desires, 
is incapacitated to look yathabhutam into the truth of the matter. 
However, we must not take them for absolute illusions, for they 
are there and yet they are not there, so that the category of 
existence fails to be applied here. From the dualistic point of 
view, we feel inclined to interpret these terms objectively as 
denoting the idea of mere transciency or unreality, but when 
the whole trend of Buddhist thought is understood, we know 
that these similes are meant to describe a state of things, to 
which such logical conceptions as .sat and asat, etc., are in­
applicable, but which must be directly experienced yathabhutam 
in one’s inmost consciousness.
The Lankavatdra says (p. 105) :
‘1 The sky [or space], the hare’s horns, and a barren woman’s 
child—
They are not, only talked of; so are things discriminated.
In the totality of causes and conditions, the ignorant dis­
criminate birth;
Not knowing this reason, they go astray in the triple world.” 
This may seem to mean: All things are mere names, their 
existence is not more than a matter of subjective discrimination; 
to think that things are really born, stay, and disappear in the 
system of causes and effects, is an illusion; all these realities 
so called have no objective validity; and, therefore, the world 
is altogether empty, void, unreal, and a mass of nothingness. 
To think this way, however, is not the position of the Maha- 
yanist. "What he wants us to do is that we should have a 
turning-over of the whole system of mentality and get a new 
point of view where we may survey the world yathabhutam. 
The sutra, therefore, states a little further down (p. 106 ff.) 
that the difference between the wise and the ignorant is that the 
former are free from Viparyasa while the latter are not. Vipar- 
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yclsa means imagining things where they are not, taking error 
for truth. The wise not hampered by this imagination see that 
the world is like maya and has no reality, but at the same time 
they know that it is there, it is not pure nothingness. Why? 
Because they have gone beyond the relativism of being and non- 
being. The waters of the Ganga are not visible to the Preta, 
but they cannot be said to be non-existent, because other beings 
see them. In a similar way, the wise have a correct view of 
things as they are free from errors in their perception of an 
objective world, which exists only in relation to one’s own mind. 
An objective world is really an error (bhranta) in so far as it 
is discriminated as existing externally and individually. Or we 
may say that an external particularised world is an illusion as 
long as the ignorant are unable to break through the fetters of 
Vikalpa, wrong discrimination; whereas the same world is to the 
wise true, such as it is (tathata). What is, therefore, an error 
to the one is truth to the other, because the latter is entirely 
free from all forms of discrimination (sarvakalpindvirahitam').
All these statements are designed to adjust our thought 
yathdbhutam to the actuality of existence, to which no logical 
predicates are applicable. To say “it is,” is eternalism (sds- 
vata), to say “it is not,” is nihilism {uccheda); and the object 
of Buddhist reasoning is to avoid these dualistic views, though 
not necessarily going to monism but to the way of experiencing 
it in its inwardness as well as in its totality.
“0 Lord of Lanka,” reads the sutra, “to see thus is called 
‘rightly seeing’; if seen otherwise it is called ‘carrying on dis­
crimination’ {vikalpa), because here is discrimination which 
leads to dualism. It is like seeing one’s own face in water, or 
like seeing one’s own shadow in the moonlight or by the lantern, 
or listening to an echo of one’s own voice in the valley, -wherein 
discrimination takes place leading to attachment. In like manner, 
to separate dharma from adharma [or a from not-o] is only due 
to discrimination, and on account of this one finds it impossible 
to do away with the distinction, thereby creating all forms of 
falsehood. One is thus unable to realise tranquillity (santi). 
By tranquillity is meant oneness of objects, and oneness of 
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objects is the highest Samadhi, from which grows an inner per­
ception by the Noble Understanding. The Tathagata-garbha is 
its objective.”1
1 From the T'ang version. The end of the first chapter.
As we see here, any thought that permits of opposition or 
antithesis such as sat and asat, dharma and adharma, is con­
sidered the outcome of Vikalpa; and as long as Vikalpa is 
cherished, one can never realise the standpoint of pure idealism 
(cittamdtra) and the yathabhiltam understanding of absolute 
oneness will never take place.
What is Meant by Being Unborn?
When mava is understood in the sense elucidated above, we 
shall find light shed over the statement that all things are un­
created, or, more literally, unborn (anutpannah sarvabhdvah). 
This is one of the phrases quite frequently met with in all 
Mahayana literature, and those who are not familiar with it will 
certainly find the phrase devoid of sense, regarding as having 
no connection with the self-realisation. But this again is a part 
of viewing things yathabhiltam. For if existence is not to be 
annotated by any one of the four propositions (catuslikotika') 
and is above the alternation of sat and asat, and not controlled 
by the law of causation (lietupratyaya), it cannot be described 
in no other way than calling it unborn, anutpanna,—unborn not 
in the sense of eternity, nor in that of uncreatedness. Things 
are unborn simply because no categories admitting contradiction 
or alternation or antithesis are applicable here. Eternity con­
trasts with noil-eternity or impermanence; uncreatedness if it has 
any relative meaning stands in opposition to creation; and if 
being unborn is taken in a similar way it limits itself and our 
perception of things will be no more yathabhutam but affected 
by Parikalpa. For this reason, the Buddha in the Lankdvatdra 
repeatedly warns us not to get confused here, but to understand 
anutpdda sarvadharmanam in its absolute, unconditioned sense.
“Why is existence regarded as unborn or unoriginated? 
Because there is neither creating nor created, and therefore no 
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causer, (i.e., creator).”1 Again,2 things are unborn because 
they are to be regarded as maya, and because the Buddha 
wishes to have the philosophers take their eyes away from logic 
and its necessary limitations. As long as the antithesis of sat 
and asat is considered objectively real, as held by some philoso­
phers, there will be the real coining into existence and the real 
passing away from it. Those who are taken to the passing-away 
aspect of existence are nihilists, while those who look for the 
eternal aspect are eternalists; and neither of them has the right 
view of it. They are attached to one thing or another, they are 
far from attaining the point where all things are perceived in 
their true bearings, that is, as manifestations of mind-only 
(cittamatradrisya'). The Lankdvatdra calls this view-point 
“Yathdbhuta-avasthdna-darsana.”3 The gatha reads:
1 P. 115. 2 P. ill. 3 P. 112.
4 P. Ill, p. 166, etc. Eternalism may not be an appropriate term 
for that school of philosophy which holds that all things have been what 
they are and remain for ever as such. This is the sasvata (eternal or per­
sistent) view of existence and stands opposed to the other view known as 
the ueeheda .(destruction or extirpation). According to the latter, there 
is nothing in the world that is real, eternally abiding, and will retain its 
identity for ever. The doctrine of Sunyata is sometimes taken for this. 
Buddhism goes the middle way between the two extremes; for, according 
to it, existence is neither temporal and forever vanishing, nor eternal and 
forever abiding. Objectively stated, it is in a state of constant becoming, 
which in terms of Mahayana philosophy is called like maya, or it is sunya 
(empty, another- difficult word to translate properly), it is unborn, it is 
not dualistic, it has no self-substance. This is the Buddhist teaching known 
as ‘ ‘ sunyata, anutpada, advaya, nihsvabhava-lakshanam sarvadharmanam. ’ ’ 
p. 73.
‘‘Because there is no causing, there is no birth;
Where existence is admitted, there is the holding of birth 
and death.
When it is seen as being like maya, etc.,
No Vikalpa takes place as regards appearances.”
This Buddhist idea of being unborn is liable to be confused 
with eternalism as is suggested by Mahamati.4 But when we 
know that anutpada (to be unborn) is not an idea constrasted 
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to utpdda (to be born) or subject to the principle of causation, 
but an idea absolutely going beyond opposites, we come nearer 
to the truth. We need an inner perception to see into the true 
nature of existence; otherwise, like the ignorant and confused we 
see things where there is really nothing, and imagine them to 
be actualities though they are like the hare’s horns or the 
tortoise’s hair.1 Vikalpa takes place here, and all looks dis­
torted. So we read in the sutra:
1 P. 62.
“According to my doctrine, there is neither being nor non- 
being, for existence is not to be characterised as being born, nor 
as disappearing. Why is there no non-being? For it is like 
seeking various objects created by the magician or in a dream. 
[As long as there are things actually seen they cannot be said 
non-existent.] Why is there no being? For the self-nature of 
all things that appear to be here, is really non-existent, they 
are seen and yet not seen, they are taken hold of and yet not 
taken hold of. Therefore, I say that things are neither existent 
nor non-existent. If one, realising that there is nothing but 
what is seen of mind, abides in the suchness of things where no 
individuation [or discrimination, vikalpa} takes place, one will 
see that all doings in the world cease. To discriminate is the 
business of the ignorant, and not of the wise. 0 Mahamati, 
it is due to the mind that discriminates that there appears a 
world destitute of reality, such as the palace of the Gandharvas 
or phantom creations of the magician. To distinguish between 
the born and the not-born, between the created and the un­
created, is like talking about the works of the magician, that 
have never been in existence and therefore that will never dis­
appear. The ignorant fail to see the self-nature of existence 
(bhavasvabhava) because their views are perverted. When 
they are thus perverted, they are unable to realise a state of 
aloofness, and as they are unable to do so, they cannot disengage 
themselves from false discrimination. As long as one sees things 
particularised in forms, there is a perception of the born and 
the unborn, and as the result discrimination goes on. Nirvana 
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is where there is no birth, no extinction; it is seeing into a state 
of suchness [or thatness] which transcends all the categories 
constructed by mind; for it is the Tathagata’s own inner con­
sciousness.”1
1 Abridged, pp. 199-200.
- M. E. Burnouf has in his French translation of the Sadclharma- 
puililanka (p. S3), “Une patience miraculeuse dans la loi”; Max Muller in 
his Sukhcmativyuha (S.B.E. XLIX, pp. 39-40, and p. 51), “Resignation to 
consequences which have not yet arisen”; Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. 
Rouse in their English translation of Santideva’s Silcsha-samuccaya (p. 
297), “Resignation to the idea of not being reborn”; and H. Kern in 
his English Saddharma-pundanka (S.B.E. XXI, p. 134), “Acquiescence in 
the eternal law. ’ ’ These show how these great Sanskrit scholars struggled 
to get at the exact meaning of anutpattikadharmalcshanti.
In connection with this anutpdda (not being born) idea, 
it may not be out of place to say a few words about the Maha­
yana conception of what is known as “ Anutpattikadharmak- 
shanti. ” One meets with this phrase quite frequently in all 
the Mahayana sutras though not so much in the Lankdvatara. 
Literally rendered, it is “not-born-objeet-patience” and
in Chinese. This evidently baffled some of the European 
translators of the Mahayana texts. But we shall be able to 
understand it much better now than they as we have already 
explained what the Mahayanists mean by all things not being 
born (sarvadharmanam anutpdda). The idea is simply this that 
the reality or substance of things is beyond all predicate which 
always implies its opposite, and, therefore, the phrase, “Anut- 
pattikadliarma,” is a statement concerning the nature of dharma 
which may abstractly be translated here as existence.
But the last term of the compound, kshanti, may be some­
what puzzling. What has patience to do with this existence 
to be designated unborn? Kshanti, of course, means “patience” 
here as when it is one of the six Paramitas, or resignation, or 
acquiescence, but not in its ordinary sense. For kshanti here 
does not mean “to endure” or “suffer patiently”; endurance 
or suffering implies unwillingness and resistance to a certain 
extent. The sense of Buddhist kshanti, however, is a willing 
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compliance or acceptance. When the anutpanna view of ex­
istence is truthfully recognised and accepted, it becomes the 
principle of one’s conduct, determining the whole attitude of 
the mind. The Chinese scholars generally take (patience) 
for (recognition) as they are both pronounced jen; but, 
strictly speaking, the term is not an intellectual one, it belongs 
to the will, it is a -whole-hearted acceptance of the ultimate fact 
(tattvam) as perceived by a mincl free from errors or wrong­
judgments (vikalpa).
In the Avatamsaka Sutra, a chapter (Sikshananda, Chapter 
XXIX, On Kshanti) is devoted to the explanation of ten kinds 
of Kshanti.1. (1) Kshanti in sounds means to listen to the 
oral teaching of the Buddha, to accept it without fear or hesita­
tion, and to abide in it whole-heartedly. (2) Kshanti of obedience 
is to reflect upon the nature of things, and truthfully penetrat­
ing into it, to keep the mind pure and serene. (3) Kshanti in 
the unborn nature of existence has already been explained. 
The rest of the ten are realised when one attains to the knowl­
edge of things as like maya(4), mirage(5), dream(6), echo(7), 
shadow(S), phenomenal(9), and empty(lO). That this way of 
looking at existence is generally Mahayanistic and that it is not 
the same as regarding existence as altogether unsubstantial from 
the relative point of view, has been already made clear as I 
hope in the preceding section.-
1 Cf. Sul:limvatlvyHha, (S.B.E. XLIX), p. 51.
2 For further definition of “ Anutpattikadharuiakshanti, ” see below.
Iiow is Nirvana Explained?
Nirvana has been the central object of Buddhist life ever 
since the Buddha’s own time, though in the Mahayana we do 
not come across the term perhaps so much as in the Hinayana. 
The idea has been replaced to a certain extent by the conceptions 
of Prajna, Sambodhi. Dharmakaya, Tathata, Pratyatmajhana, 
etc., when Buddhist thought drifted towards intellectual intui­
tionalism. The Lankdvatdra, however, has not forgotten to make 
reference to Nirvana and to interpret it in its own characteristic 12
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manner. According to its author whoever he may be, Nirvana 
is realised when one can see into the abode of suchness {yatha- 
bhiltdrtha-sthana-darsanam') -1 Here is the point the intellect 
(vikalpa) cannot enter; for it dissects and establishes somewhat 
to take hold of (gra-ha/na), and it will then see that something 
coming into existence (wfpada) and disappearing (niroclha or 
apravritti). But Nirvana has no tangible form (mmitta), and 
it neither comes into existence nor ceases from working. To 
attain Nirvana, therefore, is to see into the truth of things 
yathdbhutam, that is, as unborn, as not affected by categories 
of intellectual construction.
1 P. 200.
2 Pp. 62, 98, etc.
3 P. 99.
To attain Nirvana which is a state of emptiness (sunyata) 
inherent in the nature of things and which is again a state of 
self-realisation obtained by means of a higher wisdom (drya- 
jndna), there must be a turning over (jpardvritti) at the deepest 
seat of consciousness known as the Alaya-vijnana.1 2 The latter 
is a kind of mental receptacle where all the memory of one’s past 
deeds and psychical activities is deposited and preserved in a 
form of energy called Vasana (W® hsi-clvi, in Chinese, habit­
energy) . But as this energy is so contaminated with ignorance 
and wrong judgment and all sorts of attachment (abliinivesdta). 
it reacts upon an external world in a way deterimental to the 
realisation of Nirvana, and, therefore, to the perception, yathd- 
bhutam, of the truth. The old conditions must now be over­
hauled in order to create a new situation in our consciousness. 
To do this, we must free ourselves from the views nihilistic 
(uccheda) and eternalistic (sdsvata) and also from the notions 
of being (bhdva) and non-being (abhdva).
When this turning is effected, Nirvana is found to be devoid 
of all predicates. In it nothing is gained, nothing is cast aside, 
no extermination, no eternality,, no unity, no diversity, one finds 
here. Nirvana is the mind of all holy ones and the goal of 
Buddhist discipline.3
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The Hinayanists clo not know this ■ when they realise that 
Nirvana is something above particular conditions and tranquil 
in nature, they feel they have it in its completeness in their 
Nirvana so called. But in fact they distinguish it from birtli- 
and-death (samsara), and seek it for the fear of being caught 
up in the net of transmigration. They cherish dualism, and 
so long as they do so, there is no true Nirvana for them. 
Nirvana, according to the Lankavatara, is not to be found in 
contradiction to birth-and-death, or Samsara; for to thus dis­
tinguish one from the other is the result of wrong judgment 
(vikalpa), which imagines a future when the world of the 
senses is altogether annihilated, which is their Nirvana. The 
Mahayanistic Nirvana goes, however, beyond the dualism of 
Nirvana and Samsara. It is to be found where there is the 
identity of Nirvana and Samsara.
So long as dualism is adhered to, there is no Nirvana, no 
self-realisation. Light and shadow, long and short, black and 
white—they are mutually related; when they stand alone each 
by itself, they have no meaning. So with Nirvana. When it 
is sought after in relation to Samsara, we may have a sort of 
Nirvana. But this kind vanishes when separated from the con­
dition of mutuality in which it exists. True Nirvana is that 
which is realised in the oneness of Nirvana and Samsara, 
absolute or sunya in its nature, and above the relativity of 
eternalism and nihilism. Mahayana followers strive to realise 
this kind of Nirvana.1
1 P. 76, 126.
2 P. 182 ff.
The following passages1 2 from the Lankavatara will give us 
some ideas of Nirvana prevalent at the time when this sutra 
was compiled:
“The Buddha said, 0 Mahamati, what is regarded as Nir­
vana by the philosophers is not in accordance with the true 
features of Nirvana. Listen, 0 Mahamati, I will tell you what 
it is.
“Some philosophers, seeing how impermanent things are, 
do not cling to the individual conditions; to them no external 
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world exists, nor does the subjective mind; they do not think 
of the past, present, and future. Like the light that shines no 
more, like the seed that has no life, like the fire that no more 
burns, all attachments are gone with them, no individualising 
reflections take place, and this they consider to be Nirvana. 
But inasmuch as they see something destroyed, their Nirvana 
is not a true one, 0 Mahamati.
“Again, there are some who think the departing to another 
realm is Nirvana; there is no external world of particulars for 
them; it is like wind ceasing to blow.1
1 This last sentence does not properly belong here. There must have 
been some transposition in the text.
“Again some think, not to see the distinction between the 
knowing subject and the known object is Nirvana.
“Again, there are some who holding to the view that all 
individual appearances are real, cherish the feeling of pain; for 
they are ignorant of the truth that all is the manifestation of 
mind-only. And just because of this ignorance they are 
frightened with appearances and seek for a state where there are 
no-appearances. An intense longing for this is regarded by 
them to be Nirvana.
“Again, there are some who, reviewing things inner as 
well as external in their individual and universal aspects and 
as existing in time, think that they have self-substance, which 
is not subject to destruction, and in this they find Nirvana.
“Again, there are some who believe in the indestructibility 
of all things such as ego, being, life, growth, and personality, 
and think this to be Nirvana.
“Again, some philosophers, not being intelligent enough, 
imagine the reality of Prakriti and Purusha and think that the 
Gunas in various transformations constitute all objects; and in 
this they see Nirvana.
“Again, some philosophers see Nirvana in the extinction 
of both merit and demerit, others in the extinction of evil pas­
sions by means of knowledge, and still others in the thought that 
Isvara is really the creator.
“Again, there are some who think beings come into ex­
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istence mutually conditioning and not through any other’ cause. 
As they are without wisdom, they are unable to understand 
rightly, and because of their not understanding rightly, they 
imagine Nirvana in their own way.
“Again, there are some who, wrongly imagining what they 
have perceived to be the true path, find Nirvana here.
‘ ‘ Again, some philosophers, holding to the view that quality 
and substance are one and yet two, and mutually related and yet 
not related, think Nirvana to be in this relationship.
“Again, there are some naturalists who believe in spon­
taneous creation, saying that the peacock’s variegated beauty, 
the thorn’s pointedness, and the production of various kinds of 
precious stones from the mine,—who is the maker of all these 
things? Nobody but nature, and this is Nirvana.
“Again, some find Nirvana in the understanding of the 
twenty-five principles.
“Again, some cherish the opinion that the looking after the 
welfare of the subjects by the observance of the six virtues is 
Nirvana.
“Again, some think time is Nirvana, from which issues the 
world.
“Again, there are some who see Nirvana in that the world 
(bhava) exists, or that the world (bhava) exists not, or that the 
world exists and exists not, or that the world and Nirvana are 
not two different things.
“Again, there are some1 who, differing from all these philos­
ophers, and in possession of all knowledge, declare like a roaring 
lion to the following effect that to understand thoroughly what 
is meant by the manifestation of mind-only, not to get attached 
to the external world, to be disengaged from the four proposi­
tions, to abide in the yathabhutam view of things, not to fall 
into the errors of dualism, to be free from the ideas of subject 
and object, to stand above all forms of knowledge, not to get 
attached to any one form of truth, to abide in the realisation 
1 This is evidently the Mahayanist view of Nirvana, though it is 
treated as if it were one held by the philosophers also not belonging tel 
Buddhism.
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of the truth revealed in the noble understanding, to perceive 
the twofold truth of egolessness, to be devoid of the two kinds 
of evil passions, to be cleansed of the two kinds of hindrance, 
to discipline oneself in all the stages [of Bodhisattvahood] one 
after another, whereby, entering upon the state of Buddhahood, 
to realise all the great Samadhis such as Maya and for ever to 
go beyond the Citta, Manas, and Manovijnana:—this is to 
attain Nirvana.
“0 Mahamati, all these philosophers’ views [except the 
last mentioned] are based on imagination and not in accordance 
with the truth; they are forsaken by the wise, for they are 
dualistic and Nirvana is imagined where it is not. There is 
really no such Nirvana where one may enter or come out. The 
philosophers, each adhering to his own thesis, fall into erroneous 
views contrary to reason, thereby achieving nothing but the 
wanderings and tribulations of the mind and will. 0 Mahamati, 
therefore, you and other Bodhisattvas should avoid them.”
The Essence of Buddhahood
The self-realisation to be attained by the Bodhisattva is 
none other than the Buddha’s own inner consciousness, self- 
illuminating as well as world-illuminating. Therefore, when 
we know what is the nature of this enlightenment attained by 
the Buddha (svabuddhabuddhata), we shall also have some 
glimpse of the content of the Pratyatmaryajnanagocara, the 
subject-matter of the Lankavatdra. According to the sutra,1 
what constitutes the essence of Buddhahood (fbuddhata) is neither 
a thing made nor a thing not-made, it is neither cause nor effect, 
it is neither predicable nor unpredicable, it is neither describable 
nor indescribable, neither subject to perception nor beyond per­
ception. Why? Because by applying any one of these ter­
minological explanations (nirukta) to this ease, we commit a 
logical offence. If Buddhata, the essence of Tathagatahood, is 
something made, it is impermanent; and if it is impermanent, 
all things made will be Tathagatas—which is impossible. If, on i
i P. 187 fi.
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the other hand, it is a thing not-made, it will be without a 
substance (atmakatva), and all efforts to realise it will be to 
no purpose, as it is like the hare’s horns or a barren woman’s 
child. For are they not all not-made, unreal, merely imagined?
“Again, if the essence of Tathagatahood is neither cause 
nor effect, it is then neither being (sat) nor not-being (asat). 
And this being the case it lies outside the four propositions 
(catushkotika). The latter belong to the worldly way of talk 
and what lies outside them is no more than a talk, it is like 
speaking of a barren woman’s child. This exists only in talk 
and does not come under the four propositions. As it does not 
come under them, it is to the wise beyond their logical survey 
(pramdna). The meaning of all the Tathagatas’ words is to 
be thus understood by the wise.” (P. 188.)
This passage is taken from the Sanskrit text, which coin­
cides with one of the Chinese versions, the Tang; but when we 
weigh the meaning of the passage, we grow somewhat confused 
about it because it is in apparent contradiction to the general 
drift of thought that has been explained above as characteristic 
of the Lankavatara teaching. For if the essence of Buddhahood 
is something like the barren woman’s child existing only in 
name and placed beyond the survey of the wise in the sense that 
it has no truth in it, the object of all Buddhist discipline will 
be set at naught. If, however, it could be understood in the 
sense that the truth is beyond the logical survey even of the 
wise, and, therefore, that it is an object of direct intuition, 
altogether beyond the reach of popular parlance which is made 
up with the four propositions, the quoted passage would be 
consistent with the rest of the text. The sentence referring to 
the barren woman’s child as mere talk and beyond the four 
propositions will have to be altered. In fact, the Wei translation 
reads quite differently: “The four propositions belong to the 
worldly way of talk. 0 Mahamati, if the truth does not go 
beyond the four propositions, it is no more than a word like 
when speaking of a barren woman’s child. 0 Mahamati, this 
belongs to mere speech, coming under the four propositions, 
and if the truth thus should come under them, the wise would
230 THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
not take it up.” Evidently, there is some discrepancy in the 
text. The earliest Chinese version extant, that is, the Sung, 
reads simply and is quite intelligible, showing perhaps that this 
is a more original text not mixed with gloss and other addenda. 
“0 Mahamati, if it is neither an object (vastut) nor a cause, 
then it is neither being nor non-being; ancl if it is neither 
being nor non-being, it lies outside the four propositions. The 
latter belong to worldly talk. When it [or the essence of Bud- 
dhahood] lies outside the four propositions it does not come 
under them, and as it does not come under them, the wise take 
to it. The meaning of all the Tathagata’s propositions is to 
be understood by the wise thus [that is, as beyond the four 
propositions].”
When Buddhism speaks of the egolessness (niratmcma) of 
all things (sarvadharma), this must be understood in the same 
way as suggested above, that is, in the sense that while all things 
have their characteristic marks (svcdaksluma), they are without 
self-substance (at man). Inasmuch as the cow is not a horse 
and the horse is not a cow, they are quite distinct one from the 
other. Their individuality is to be reckoned with, but as to each 
having its self-substance or something that remains eternally 
so besides its appearances (lakshana), there is no substance in it. 
Therefore, things are in one sense as they are, but in another 
sense they are not. This is what is meant by Buddhist phenom­
enalism, but we are not to be carried away by its doctrine of 
emptiness as was explained before, as Buddhism has after all 
something to affirm. Its superficially paradoxical way of pre­
senting the truth is often baffling to logicians. The Lankavatara 
proceeds to say that the ignorant and confused use their own 
way of discrimination (vikalpa) to grasp the theory of non-ego, 
but as existence is really beyond any system of categories, the 
Tathagata’s wisdom alone is capable of penetrating into reality. 
It is, therefore, declared by him that he is not distinct from the 
Skandhas, nor is he identical with them.1
The two horns of the cow are distinguished one from the
1 P. 188.
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other, for the one is longer or shorter than the other, and in 
colour too they may differ. But they are of one nature as they 
are both horns. In a similar way, the Tathagata is different 
from what constitutes matter, and yet he is not different. Again, 
he is designated as one who is emancipated {moksha'), but he 
is not one with the emancipation, nor is he different from it. 
Therefore, the essence of Buddhahood is neither eternal nor 
transcient, neither made nor not-made, neither composite nor un­
composite, neither knowledge nor the known, neither predicable 
nor unpredicable, neither of the Skandhas nor not of them, neither 
describable nor indescribable. It is beyond all measurement, it 
is not to be brought under any form of category. We may talk 
of it as talk we must, but we can never reach it through words. 
For it is unborn, and consequently not subject to destruction. 
It is like unto the sky beyond logical constructions, and no 
amount of intellectual tricks (prapahca) will bring it within 
one’s grasp. The essence, buddhaia, transcends measurement 
(pranidna) and the senses (indriya').1
1 P. 189 f.
- See pp. 206, 207, 259, 260, etc., of the present magazine.
The. Lankdvatdra is quite anxious to let us realise that the 
theory of non-ego does not conflict with that of the Tathagata’s 
Womb (tathdgata-garbha), of which mention was macle else­
where.3 When the Tathagata-garbha is spoken of as a kind of 
storage where all the seeds of the past deeds and psychical
activities are preserved, philosophers are apt to take it for an 
ego-soul. But, says the Lankdvatdra, the Tathagata-garbha is 
empty in its nature yet real, it is Nirvana itself, unborn, without 
predicates, without affections (apranihita), and, further, it is 
attained where no false discrimination {nirvikalpa) takes place, 
where no shadow (nirabhdsa) of particularisation falls. There 
is nothing here for the Buddhas or Bodhisattvas to take hold 
of as an ego-soul. They have gone beyond the sphere of false 
discrimination and wrongful judgment, and it is due to their 
wisdom and skilful device (updya) that they set up all kinds 
of names and phrases in order to save their followers from mis­
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taken views of reality. Pudgala (soul), Samtati (continuity), 
Skandha (aggregate), Pratyava (causation), Anu (atom), Pra- 
dhana (supreme soul), Isvara (god), Kartri (creator) :—some 
such ideas are entertained by the philosophers, but they are 
mere constructions of mind.3
The World-transcending Knowledge.
The inner consciousness of the Buddha, which constitutes 
the essence of Buddhahood (svahuddhahuddhatd), is the highest 
form of knowledge (yfiuiio). Of knowledge the Lankdvatdra 
distinguishes three forms: (1) worldly knowledge (jndnam 
laukikam), (2) supra-worldly knowledge (lokottaram), and 
(3) supreme supra-worldly knowledge (Jokottaratamam). The 
first is relative as cherished by ordinary minds whose thinking 
is determined by ideas of being and non-being; the second is 
one possessed by the Hinayanists who cannot go beyond the 
categories of particularity and universality (svasdmdnyalak- 
shana) ; while the third and the highest is the knowledge attained 
by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who view the world from an 
absolute standpoint, for they know that the world is above all 
characteristics, that is, has never been brought into existence 
and will never be annihilated, that it is designable neither as 
being nor as non-being. It is by means of this highest knowl­
edge that the Bodhisattvas finally come to the realisation of 
the egolessness (nairatmya) of all things, thus entering upon 
the path of Tathagatahood.2
This supreme supra-worldly knowledge is no other than the 
Noble Knowledge (aryajnana) of the Bodhisattva, which enables 
him to enter into the innermost nature (svapratyatma) of all the 
Buddhas, and which constitutes the central theme of the Lan­
kdvatdra sutra. Its three aspects are now distinguished.3 The 
first is its not being mere appearance (nirdblidsa), that it is 
reality, as distinguished from the way it is regarded generally
1 Pp. 78-79.
2 P. 156 f.
3 P. 49.
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by the Hinayanists and the philosophers. Secondly, it is 
awakened by the will (pranidhana) and power (aclhishthana) 
of all the Buddhas. That is to say, the Noble Knowledge is made 
possible to rise in the mind of the Bodhisattva by the virtue of 
the Buddhas’ earnest desire for universal enlightenment and 
salvation; their earnest desire or will sends out strong waves of 
vibration throughout the universe, and all sentient beings there 
feel its effect according to their capacities. Thirdly, sustained by 
this and going beyond the relative, knowledge of the Hinayanists, 
the Bodhisattva’s mind is freed from all predicable forms and 
ready for realising in himself a psychic state termed Mayopama- 
samadhikaya. He is now fairly on the way to the final stage 
of Buddhahood.
In Buddhism no distinction is made between knowledge and 
knower. The Noble Knowledge (aryajnana) is at once the inner 
perception and the mental power that brings about this percep­
tion. This is quite in accordance with the general mode of 
thinking in Buddhism; for if there is something at the back 
of the knowledge, or if this is the function of a certain higher 
faculty in the mind, there will be a dualism which is so strongly 
combated by the Mahayanists. The knowledge after all must 
be absolute; so Prajna, which is the same thing as Arya-jnana, 
is described as one of the six Paramitas (virtues of perfection) 
in the following manner.1 As the Hinayanists cling to the idea 
of Nirvana for their own spiritual enjoyment (atmasuJcha), they 
are unable to think of the welfare of their fellow-beings. With 
the Mahayanists it is different, they are ever bent upon practis­
ing all the six Paramitas in their highest possible form; and, 
therefore, in Prajna, their minds are free from false discrimina­
tion (vikalpa) ; they do not fall into either of any opposing 
predicates as they are awake to the suchness of reality; they 
are thus able to cause a turning (pardvritti) in the whole field 
of their consciousness, though this does not mean that they 
destroy the work of their own past karma. Prajna thus leads 
them finally to the realisation of the inmost truth deeply con-
1 P. 23S.
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cealed under the wrappings of attachment and intellectualism.
Doctrine of the Triple Body
When the Lankavatdra was compiled, the doctrine of the 
Triple Body (trikaya) was not apparently yet formulated in 
the shape we have it today. We have thus terms corresponding 
to the Three Bodies and the indications of the underlying idea, 
but no specified relationship is established between them. Only 
the absolute state of self-realisation is considered belonging to 
the Dharmata-Buddha,1 who is evidently the Dharmakaya of the 
the later periods.
1 P. 56.
- P. 28.
3 P. 34.
4 Pp. 28, 34, 56, 93, etc.
There are other forms of Buddhahood known as Nishyanda- 
Buddha and Nirmana-Buddha. Nishyanda literally means 
“flowing down”, or “flowing into”, and the Nishyanda-Buddha 
is a Buddha into whom Dharmata flows and who shines in 
splendour. The two later Chinese translators have rendered 
it by pao-fo, and means “to requite”, “to compensate” ; 
while the Sung by Gunabhadra lias i-fo, meaning “to 
depend”, or “to rely upon.” The latter is nearer to the sense 
of the Sanskrit nishyanda, and it is hard to know how the later 
translators came to have $|£ for it instead of -f&- Did they try 
to read their own thought into it? For they were doubtless ac­
quainted in their own day with the doctrine of Trikaya, one of 
which is generally known as Sambhogakaya, and to which the 
Lankavatdra has the corresponding Vipakaja1 2 or Vipa-
kastha3
The other form of Buddhahood mentioned in the Lankdva- 
tdra is Nirmanaika or Nairmanika or Nirmana.4 This is gen­
erally done into Chinese by ft® °r i-e-> Transformation-
Buddha, corresponding to the Nirmana-kaya of the Triple Body. 
As to what is this Transformation-Buddha, the sutra does not 
offer any explanation. But when the distinction is made be­
tween the Nirmana-Buddha and the Dharmata-Buddha as to
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their method and material of preaching, we can have a glimpse 
into the specific features of the Nirmana-Buddha. The Lan­
kavatara1 2 makes the latter the teacher of the ordinary people 
generally known as “bala and prithagjana” in Buddhist litera­
ture, while the Dharmata-Buddha discusses about an inner per­
ception penetrating into the suchness of truth, or about the 
self-absorbing contemplation by Noble Knowledge (aryajncma) 
on the ultimate condition of things which cannot be reached 
by logical categories. The class of beings designated as “bala 
and prithagjana”, which includes almost all of us as drifting- 
over the ocean of contrary ideas, is not able to see behind the 
veil of ignorance and wrong judgment (vikalpa), and to lead 
this unfortunate group of sentient beings to salvation or en­
lightenment, the Nirmana-Buddha would discuss about the 
aspects of particularity {svalakshana} and universality {samdn- 
yalakshana) as objects of the intellect. His preaching is thus 
concerned with the individualising side of existence (prabheda- 
pracdra), which is dealt with in Buddhist philosophy under 
such categories as the six Paramitas, five Skandhas, twelve 
Ayatanas, eighteen Dhatus, methods of emancipation (wmofcs7ra), 
modes of consciousness, and other subjects.2 The object of 
these discourses is naturally to go beyond the teachings of the 
various philosophical schools of the day. The Dharmata- 
Buddha, on the other hand, is meant for the Bodhisattvas whose 
aim is to come to the highest realisation of truth, which is, 
Pratyatmaryajnana-gatigocara.
1 P. 93.
2 P. 57.
3 P. 56 f.
The distinction, however, between the Nirmana-Buddha and 
the Nishyanda-Buddha is not clear as far as the Lankavatara is 
concerned. For it describes the latter as performing almost the 
same function as the Nirmana-Buddha.3 His teaching is said 
to consist of such topics as particularity, universality, Habit­
energy Lvdsana) conserved in the deep recesses of consciousness, 
wrong judgments about it, and their interrelations causing 
multitudinousness of objects to appear, and then our inordinate 
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attachment to them, but in reality the non-existence of all these 
phenomena. Of these topics, the Dharmata-nishyanda Buddha 
will speak thus: the conception of an individual ego-substance 
arises from our wrong judgment concerning the nature of ex­
istence and the law of causation, both of which fail to apply 
beyond the world of relativity which is silnya (empty) ; it is 
like the creations of the magician, he knows how to produce 
variety of unrealities depending upon some objects of the senses 
such as plants, bricks, etc.; the spectators are induced to take 
them for real objects, though in fact there are none such. To 
the ordinary mind, the law of causation is made to extend beyond 
the world of relativity, which is also the world of wrong judg­
ments and attachments; whereas the world which supplies a 
subject-matter for the Dharmata-Buddha is altogether unsup­
ported (niralamba), disengaged from dependence (alamba- 
vigata), that is to say, it is not to be subsumed under such 
notions as creation, sense-perception, inference, and others, as 
it is not to be found among the contents of thought cherished 
by the ordinary ego-bound minds, in which the Hinayanists and 
philosophers are included. The Dharmata-Buddha points direct­
ly to the truth of immediate perception in which the Bodhisattva 
stands all by himself detached from the hypothetical creations 
of the mind.
From this we can see what the Dharmata-Buddha teaches 
in contradistinction to the other two Buddhas, the Nirmana and 
the Nishyanda; but as to the distinguishing marks between the 
letter two we fail to get any definite and specific ideas. When 
the universe is divided into two aspects, absolute and relative, 
the absolute one belongs to the Dharmata while the relative one 
is the common province of the Nirmana and Nishyanda. One 
may ask, Why this distinction then? As far as the Lank ava­
tar a goes, this question is unanswered. We can say only this, 
that the doctrine of Trikaya must have already been in progress 
at the time of the Lankavatara and the compiler of the sutra 
took it for granted that his readers were acquainted with the 
idea. It was evidently sometime later that the doctrine came 
to be dogmatised. The term “Dharmakaya” occurs at several 
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places1 in this sutra, but no “ Sambhogakaya ”, nor “Nirmana­
kaya,” perhaps except once in p. 241.1 2 However, that the 
Bucldha is able as he wills to manifest himself as a Nirmanakaya 
in response to the earnest desires of his followers or in order 
to execute his own purposes, is foreshadowed in the conception 
of Manomayakaya, “mind-made-body,” or “will-body.”3 This 
is a kind of Nirmanakaya assumed by the Bodhisattva as well 
as by the Tathagata.
1 Pp. 51, 70, 192, 212, etc.; as Tathagatakaya, pp. 42, 43, 51.
2 One difference between the Transformation-Buddha and the Dha.r- 
mata-Buddha is described to be as follows:
“The Tathagata of transformation (nirmita-nairmanika') is attended 
by Vajrapani, but not the original Tathagata (maula-tathagata). The 
original Tathagata is beyond all senses and reasonings, cannot be known 
by the simple-minded, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers. He 
abides in a state of bliss which follows from the perception of the 
truth as he has perfected himself in the doctrine of wisdom and patience. 
He requires no attendance of Vajrapani. No Buddhas of trans­
formation (nirmitahuddha) are born of karma (no karma-pra'bliava'), yet 
they are neither the same nor different with the Tathagata. Like the 
potter who produces articles by bringing various conditions together, the 
transformation-Buddhas preach the Dharma when circumstances are pro­
vided for them, but they are incapable of discoursing on the state of con­
sciousness realised by the noble understanding which leads to an inner per­
ception of truth.” (P. 242).
3 Pp. 81, 136, 192.
4 p 242.
3 This sketchy and incidental reference to the doctrine of the Triple 
Body as foreshadowed in the Lankavatara, is far from being satisfactory. 
When an article exclusively devoted to the treatment of the Tathagata is 
written, a fuller exposition of the subject will be presented.
One thing I wished to emphasise in this statement concern­
ing the three forms of Buddhahood was that the story of the 
inmost perception to be gained by the Bodhisattvas, forming 
the central theme of the Lankavatara, is told only by the Mula- 
tathagata,4 or true Tathagata as in the Tang ver­
sion, because he is above all senses, all logical measurements 
(sarvapramdna), and cannot be perceived by the Sravakas and 
Pratyekabuddhas as well as by the philosophers; because he 
abides absorbed in the bliss of realisation and in the perfection 
of the highest knowledge.5
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The Highest Knowledge and a First Cause
We know now that the Noble Knowledge realised in one’s 
inmost depths of emis&wusiieas{pratydtmajridna') is something ab­
solutely defying all description and altogether unpredicable, and 
that it is thus the topic to be properly dealt with by Dharmata- 
Buddlia himself and not by any other beings subject somehow 
to the principle of relativity. This knowledge is thus eternal, 
unconditioned, beyond the reach of all thinkability, and belongs 
to the highest principle of cognition from which all relative 
knowledge is derivable. Now the question is, In what respect 
does this differ from the first cause (karana) considered by the 
philosophers to be also eternal (mtya) and beyond thought 
(acintya) '? This is answered by the author of the Lankdvatdra 
in the following manner d
What is claimed to be the first cause by the philosophers 
cannot really be so, because a cause always presupposes some­
thing beyond and cannot be its own cause. The idea of causa­
tion belongs to a world of relativity, and what is relative cannot 
be eternal and is always within the sphere of thought. If we 
take a thing belonging to the relative world and therefore to a 
realm of action, as a first cause from which everything else has 
its beginning, this will be a wrong form of inference; for we 
jump from relativity to transcendentality, from impermanence 
to eternity, from a thing that is to a thing that is on the other 
side of being and non-being. Therefore, what is regarded by 
the philosophers as the first cause eternal and beyond think­
ability is not to be identified with the Noble Knowledge attain­
able by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
That the Noble Knowledge is eternal and cannot be made 
a subject of thought, comes from its intrinsic nature. For it is 
a state of mind realised personally by the Buddhas when they 
deeply delve into the ultimate principle itself which is not con­
ditioned by any category of thought. It is not to be designated 
as a cause which is bound up with its antecedents and eon-
1 P. 59 ft.
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sequents, it stands all by itself as absolute knowledge flashed 
through one’s consciousness, it is a fact of experience which does 
not allow of any arguments. It is Tathata (suchness), Tattva 
(tliatness), perceived in the inmost consciousness of the Tatha­
gata. As it is not an object external to him, it is a self-sufficient 
cause not depending on anything. We may say that this is a 
state of pure perception (pratyainiagati).
And it is for this reason that the Lankdvatdra is ever per­
sistent in making this pure perception not an object of discur­
sive understanding for the ordinary minds, for the philosophers, 
for the Hinayanists. It is not only too exalted a subject for 
them to comprehend, but quite beyond logic and liable to be 
wrongly and disastrously interpreted by them. It is meant for 
those only who are not at all surprised, or alarmed, or frightened 
at hearing that there is a thing beyond one’s power of thinking, 
for such belong to the family of Tathagatayana.1 The Maha- 
yanist does not deny the reality of the objective world as 
regards its relativity, where all conditions obtain, it only refuses 
to extend these to a realm where they do not apply, and as to 
the existence and reality of such a realm he is firmly convinced 
because his inner perception testifies to it. What stronger and 
more intimate and more convincing proof could one ever expect 
to offer for a truth ? Therefore, Lankdvatdra boldly declares :1 2
1 P. 64.
2 P. 65.
3 These are the spiritual attainments of the Hinayanists, arhatship 
being' the highest of the four.
“Srotapatti-phala Skridagami-phala (--^5^),
Anagami-phala anc^ Arhattva (^gt^.)3—they are all
perturbed states of mind. Sometimes I speak of the Triple 
Vehicle, sometimes of the One Vehicle, and sometimes of No­
vehicle ; all these distinctions are meant for the ignorant, for 
men of inferior wisdom, and even for the noble-minded. As 
to the entering into the ultimate truth (paramartha), it goes 
beyond dualism. When one is abiding where there are no images 
(nirdbiidaa), how could the Triple Vehicle be established? All 
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kinds of Dliyana, Apramana, Arupa, Samadhi, and the Extinc­
tion of Thoughts1—they do not exist except as purely psychical 
(cittamdtra).”1 2
1 Summarily stated, these are all different forms of meditation.
- P. 65.
3 P. 229 ft.
The Parable. of the Sands of the Ganga
From the absolute point of view, no use is apparently to be 
found for anything in the world ■ no talk is needed, no sermonis­
ing avails, and, therefore, let the world go as it pleases and work 
out its own solution if it ever -wants; for what are the Buddhas 
and Bodhisattvas after all? This is then the question awaiting 
the absolutist ’s solution. The following passages concerning the 
parable of the sands of the Ganga will be edifying in this 
respect :3
“At that time Mahamati asked the Blessed- One, Thou 
teachest in the scriptural text (desandpdta) that the Tathagatas 
of the past, future, and present are like the sands of the Ganga; 
is this to be understood literally? Or is there another meaning 
to it ’ Explain it to me, 0 Blessed one!
“To this the Blessed One answered: 0 Mahamati, do not 
understand it literally. The Buddhas of the past, future, and 
present are not to be measured according to the measure of 
the sands of the Ganga. Why? Because the comparison goes 
beyond this world, it is no fair comparison, there is something 
resembling in it but not quite exact. And, 0 Mahamati, the 
Tathagatas do not hold up a comparison going beyond this 
world and not of complete resemblance. What has been told 
by myself and the Tathagatas is no more than a small portion 
of real resemblance. When I say that there are Tathagatas 
equal to the sands of the Ganga, it is meant to make those 
stupid and vulgar people tremble, who, following the modes 
of feeling and the erroneous views which are cherished by some 
philosophers, get attached to them, thinking that there is an 
eternal being or that there is not, go on revolving around the 
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wheel of existence, of birth and death. How are they to be 
kept away from the strait pass of the wheel of existence so that 
they come to long for a superior object ancl lay hold of a 
superior object? Thus it is shown that Buddhahood is easy to 
attain. If it is told that the appearance of a Tathagata is like 
the blooming of the udumbara, they may not exert themselves. 
[Therefore, I preach that the Tathagatas are like the sands of 
the Ganga. But again,] considering what people are to be led, 
I hold out in the scriptural text that the appearance of the 
Tathagata is a matter of utmost rarity as the blooming of the 
udumbara plant. 0 Mahamati, the udumbara flower has never 
been seen by anybody, while the Tathagatas have already 
appeared in the world and are here even now. To say that the 
appearance of the Tathagata is as rare an event as the blooming 
of udumbara plant is not a statement put forward in accordance 
with my inner knowledge. When a statement is shown in ac­
cordance with my inner knowledge, it goes beyond, it oversteps 
any comparison that may be made in the world, because of its 
unbelievableness, and it will not be believed by stupid and 
vulgar people. No comparisons hold good in the realm of the 
Noble Understanding which is attained by an inner realisation, 
because the truth (tattvam) goes beyond those marks visible to 
the Cittam, Manas, and Manovijnana. The truth is the Tatha­
gata, therefore no comparisons are adequate here.
“Nevertheless, 0 Mahamati, just a little of comparison is 
given, that is, Tathagatas are said to be equal to the sands of 
the Ganga, they are equal, they are not different, yet the com­
parison is not proper, nor erroneous. 0 Mahamati, for instance, 
the sands of the river Ganga are violently trampled on by 
fishes, tortoises, porpoises, crocodiles, buffaloes, lions, elephants, 
etc., but the sands are not troubled, have no ill feelings, nor 
are they unconscious of being trampled on; they are without 
imagination, beautifully clear ancl devoid of impurities. Even 
so with the Tathagatas, 0 Mahamati, their Noble Understanding 
attained by an inner perception is the great river of Ganga, and 
their powers, psychic faculties, self-mastery are the sands; and 
they are trampled by the philosophers, stupid people, and 
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antagonists, who are the fishes, but they are not troubled, they 
have no ill feelings. The Tathagatas, because of their original 
vows, fulfilling all the bliss that accrues from perfect mental 
concordance (samapat ti) for the sake of all beings, are not 
troubled, have no ill feelings. Therefore, the Tathagatas, like 
the sands of the river of Ganga, do not particularise, as they 
are above likes and dislikes.
“0 Mahamati, the sands of the river of Ganga do not lose 
their earthly quality even when fire breaks out on earth at 
the end of the kalpa, because the sands are of the nature of the 
earth itself. And, 0 Mahamati, as the earth is bound up with 
the fiery element, it will never burn up, only it is imagined by 
stupid and vulgar people who are fallen into the way of un­
truthfulness that the earth will burn up because of continuity. 
But it will not burn up because it is the element on which fire 
subsists. Even so, 0 Mahamati, the Tathagata’s Dharma-body, 
like the sands of the Ganga, is not destructible.
“0 Mahamati, as the sands of the river Ganga are im­
measurable, even so, 0 Mahamati, the Tathagata’s rays of light 
are immeasurable, which are shed by the Tathagatas over the 
assemblies and circles of all the Buddhas in order to effect the 
ripening and inspiring of all beings.
“0 Mahamati, as the sands of the river Ganga, retaining 
their quality of being themselves, do not change into anything 
else, even so, 0 Mahamati, the Tathagatas, because of their 
severance from the cause of conditional existence, have gone 
beyond the realm of birth-and-death.1
1 Literally, ‘1 are neither produced nor vanishing in Samsara. ’ ’
“0 Mahamati, as the sands of the river Ganga are uncon­
cerned whether some of them are taken away or whether more 
are thrown in, even so, 0 Mahamati, the Tathagatas’ wisdom 
(j-ilana) which is engaged in the ripening of all beings knows 
neither decrease nor increase, for the Dharma is without cor­
poreality. Beings endowed with the body, 0 Mahamati, are 
destructible, not so with beings without the body; and the 
Dharma is without the body.
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“0 Mahamati, as a man cannot obtain ghee or oil or things 
like that from the sands of the river Ganga, however hard he 
may squeeze them to get it, even so, 0 Mahamati, the Tathagatas, 
however painfully hard they may be oppressed for the sake of 
all beings, never neglect the fulfilling of their original vows 
which they cherish in the depths of their hearts in the Dhar- 
madhatu [i.e., realm of the Dharma], so long as all beings are not 
led into Nirvana by the Tathagatas, and this is due to the latter’s 
being endowed with great compassion.
“0 Mahamati, as the sands of the river Ganga flow along 
the banks of its water and not where there is no water, even so, 
0 Mahamati, all the discourses by the Tathagatas on the Buddha- 
dharma take place in accordance with the stream of Nirvana. 
For this reason the Tathagatas are said to be like the sands of 
the river Ganga. 0 Mahamati, the sense of transmigration 
here does not apply to the Tathagatas. 0 Mahamati, decay is 
the sense of transmigration. And, 0 Mahamati, the ultimate 
end of birth-and-death is not to be known. Not being known, 
how am I to disclose the Dharma in the sense of transmigra­
tion? Annihilation is the sense of transmigration. 0 Maha­
mati, this is not known to stupid and vulgar people.
“Mahamati asked, If, 0 the Blessed One, the ultimate end 
is not knowable, how is it possible for all sentient beings to 
obtain deliverance as they are living in the midst of birth-and- 
death ?
“Said the Blessed One, 0 Mahamati, when the cause is 
removed which is the memory [i.e., habit-energy or vdsand] of 
erroneous reasoning and faulty discrimination since beg'inning- 
less time, and when there takes place a turning at the seat of 
discrimination by realising that external objects are appearances 
or manifestations of one’s own mind, then there is deliverance, 
which is not annihilation. Therefore, 0 Mahamati, there is no 
occasion for speaking of endlessness. An endless end is a 
synonym of discrimination, 0 Mahamati; and apart from dis­
crimination, there is no other being whatever here. When the 
inner world or the outer one is surveyed by wisdom (InicMlw), 
we find indeed, 0 Mahamati, all objects transcending the dualism 
244 THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
of knowing ancl being known. Only because of not knowing 
one’s own discriminating mind, discrimination takes place; when 
this is realised, it disappears.
‘ ‘ On this occasion this was uttered:
“Those who see the Buddhas as not related to destruction, 
nor to transmigration, like the sands of Ganga, see the Tatlia- 
gatas:
“Like the sands of Ganga which are free from all defects 
always flowing along the current, so is the substance of Buddha- 
hood.”
PART II
The Intellectual Content of the Buddhist Experience
Having elucidated to a certain extent though not so ex­
haustively as a thorough survey of the Lankavatara may require, 
as regards the nature of the inmost consciousness of the Tatha­
gata known as Pratyatmaryajnagocara, let us now proceed to 
see what intellectual equipment is needed for a Bodhisattva 
before he can attain to this inner realisation so emphatically 
acclaimed in the sutra. This intellectual equipment consisting 
of two parts, logical and psychological, is in a way the philo­
sophical content of the intuitive experience attained by the Bod­
hisattva. It may be regarded either as the intellectual attitude 
to be acquired by him before he enters upon the path of Buddhist 
discipline, or as the philosophy of what he has realised, which 
as a rational being he is to elaborate later on. In either case, 
the Lankavatara offers us a thorough going idealism along with 
the message of self-realisation, and this has been the point of 
discussion as referred to before among the Buddhist exegetists 
who wished to decide which was the more important topic of 
the sutra. Whatever this may be, we are now prepared to see 
what is the philosophical background of the Buddhist experience.
Historically, the Lankavatara has been considered as ex­
position of the following subjects: the five Dharmas, three 
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Svabhavas, eight Vijfianas and two Nairatmyas. Buddhist 
scholars, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese, were always quite 
partial to what may be termed a numerical method of analysis. 
The whole text was first analysed into so many parts, and each 
part again into so many sections, and so on; and then the 
important ideas developed in them were picked up, and gathered 
up numerically in order one, two, three and so on. They thus 
often failed to see one central thought running through the text, 
like the mountaineer whose attention is constantly arrested by 
details in his way and fails to take in the mountain as a whole. 
Now, the Lankavat lira’s philosophy is absolute idealism, and 
all these numerical headings are details used to establish the 
main theme. But I will here first discuss each subject separately 
and then arrange it so as to bring out. the whole system in a 
more centralised shape.
The Five Dharmas
The five categories (dharma’) are Name (nama), Appear­
ance (nimitta), Discrimination (vikalpa), Right Knowledge 
(samycigjnana), and Suchness (tathata).1 Those who are de­
sirous of attaining to the spirituality of the Tathagata are re­
quested to know what these five categories are; for they are 
unknown to the ordinary-minded, and, as they are unknown, 
the latter judge wrongly and get attached to appearances. Now 
Names are not real things, they are merely symbolical (sambeta), 
they are not worth getting attached to as realities. The 
ignorant minds flow along the stream of unreal constructions, 
thinking all the time that there are really such things as “me” 
and “mine.” They get a tenacious hold on these imaginary 
objects, over which they learn to cherish greed, anger, and 
infatuation, altogether veiling the light of wisdom. These pas­
sions lead to actions, which, being repeated, go on to weave a 
cocoon for the agent. He is now securely imprisoned in it and 
unable to see himself free from the encumbering threads of wrong 
judgments. He now drifts along in the ocean of transmigra­
1 P. 224 ff, p. 228.
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tion, and, like the wheel turning around the same axile, he 
never gets out of the rut. He never grows or develops, he is 
the same old sin-committing, blindly-groping fellow. Due to 
this infatuation, he is unable to see that all things are like maya, 
mirage, or a lunar reflection in water ■ he is unable to disengage 
himself from the false idea of self-substance (svabhdva), of 
“me and mine,” of subject and object, of birth, staying, and 
death, he does not realise that all these are creations of mind 
and wrongly interpreted. Foi’ this reason they finally come to 
cherish such notions as Isvara, Time' Atom, and Pradhana, 
and so inextricably involved in appearances they forever turn 
on the wheel of ignorance.
By Appearances (nimitta) are meant qualities belonging 
to sense-objects such as visual, olfactory, etc.; and by discrim­
ination (vikal-pa) is meant the naming of all these objects 
and qualities, distinguishing one from another.1
Right Knowledge (samyagjndna) consists in rightly com­
prehending the nature of Names and Appearances as predica­
ting or determining each other. It consists in seeing mind as 
not agitated by external objects, in not being carried away 
by dualism such as nihilism and eternalism, and in not falling 
into the state of Sravakaliood and Pratyekabuddhahood as well 
as into the position of the philosopher.
When one surveys by the aid of this Right Knowledge over 
a world of Names and Appearances, one realises that they are 
to be known as neither non-existent nor existent, that they are 
in themselves above the dualism of assertion (samdropa) and 
refutation (apavada), and that the mind abides in a state of 
absolute tranquillity not disturbed by Names and Appearances. 
When this is attained one gets into a state of Suchness (tathata'), 
and as it is where no images are reflected the Bodhisattva will 
experience joy.
ly which names are set up. Expressions are given to appearances, saying 
This is such, and not otherwise’; and we have names such as elephant,
1 More literally: “Then, again, 0 Mahamati, discrimination is that
horse, wheel, footman, woman, or man, wherein discrimination takes place.”
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The Three Forms of Knowledge
The three forms of knowledge known as three Svabhava- 
lakshana1 are more or less a recapitulation or re-classification of 
the five Dharmas. Svabhdva literally means “self-nature,” and 
l.akshctna “a characteristic mark”; and, therefore, the combina­
tion may apply to the nature of knowledge itself and also to its 
object. But the motive underlying the classification is to see 
what knowledge is required for the attainment of the truth 
that will release one from the pain and bondage of existence, 
and the three characteristic marks so called will more properly 
apply to knowledge than to its object. In this case the term 
“svabhavalakshanatraya” may be understood as meaning three 
characteristic signs by which the nature of a knowledge may be 
distinguished.
1 Pp. 67, 227.
The first is known as Parikalpita, wrong discrimination or 
judgment, and comes from not rightly comprehending the nature 
of objects, internal as well as external, and also the relationship 
existing between objects as independent individuals or as belong­
ing to a genus. The second is Paratantra, literally, “depending 
on another,” is a knowledge based on some fact, which is not 
however in correspondence with the real nature of the object. 
The characteristic of this knowledge is that it is not altogether 
a subjective creation produced cut of pure nothingness, but it 
is a construction of some objective reality on which it depends 
for material. Therefore, its definition is “that which arises 
depending upon a support or basis (dshraya)And it is due 
to this knowledge that all kinds of objects, external and internal, 
are recognised, and in these, individuality and universality are 
distinguished.2 Paratantra is thus equivalent to what we now­
adays call relative knowledge, while Parikalpita is the fab­
rication of one’s own imagination or mind. In the dark a man 
steps on something, and imagining it to be a snake he is frighten­
ed. This is Parikalpita, his wrong judgment attended with 
unwarranted excitement. lie now bends down and examines 
P. 67.
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it closely when he finds it to be a piece of rope. This is Para­
tantra, his relative knowledge. He does not yet know what really 
the rope is and thinks it to be a reality, individual and ultimate.1
1 See also p. 130 ff. The giitha, however, is very difficult to under­
stand.
Pp. 67, 227.
While it may be difficult to distinguish sharply Parikalpita 
from Paratantra from these brief statements or definitions, the 
latter seems to have at least a certain degree of truth as regards 
objects themselves, but the former implies not only an intel­
lectual mistake but some affective functions set in motion along 
with the wrong judgment. When an object is perceived as an 
object existing externally or internally and determinable under 
the categories of particularity and universality, the Paratantra 
form of cognition takes place. Accepting this as real, the mind 
elaborates on it further both intellectually and affectively, and 
this is the Parikalpita form of knowledge. It may be after 
all more confusing to apply our modern ways of thinking to 
the older ones especially when these -were actuated purely by 
religious requirements and not at all by any disinterested philo­
sophical ones.
The third form of knowledge is Parinishpanna, perfected 
one, and corresponds to the Right Knowledge (samyagjndna') 
and Suchness (tathata) of the five Dharmas. It is the knowl­
edge available when we reach the state of self-realisation by 
going beyond names and appearances and all forms of dis­
crimination or judgment (vikalpa'). It is Suchness itself, it 
is the Tathagata-garbha-hridaya, it is something indestructible 
(avinilsah) 2 The rope is now perceived in its true perspective. 
It is not an object constructed out of causes and conditions and 
now lying before us as something external. From the absolu­
tist’s point of view which is assumed by the Lankavatara, the 
rope is a reflection of our own mind, it has no objectivity apart 
from the latter, it is in this respect non-existent. But the mind 
out of which the whole world evolves is the object of Parish- 
panna, perfectly-attained-knowledge.
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The relation between the five Dharmas ancl the three Svab- 
havas may be tabulated as follows:
Five Dharmas
f Nama, }
j Nimitta, j............
■ Vikalpa, ..............
Samyagjnana, (
_ Tathata. J ' ’
Parikalpita, 'I
Paratantra, rc^m-
( Svabhavas.
Parinishpanna. J
In going over this tabulation as in the study of other parts of 
Buddhist philosophy, we must have one thing always before our 
minds, as I stated elsewhere, which is that Buddhist thought is 
the outcome of Buddhist life, that its logic or psychology or 
metaphysics cannot be understood adequately unless we realise 
that facts of Buddhist experience are at its basis and therefore 
that pure logic is not the key to the understanding of Buddhist 
philosophy.
The Two Kinds of Knowledge
The division of knowledge or truth (safya) into two forms, 
Samvritti and Paramartha, is also known to the author of the 
Lankavatara, but it was due to the Madhvamika school of Nagar- 
juna that the distinction was thoroughly formulated into a 
system and made most of it to account for the dual aspect of 
experience in their treatises on the doctrine of the Middle Path. 
In the Lankavatara we may say that the idea is foreshadowed 
when it makes reference to Vyavahara,1 according to which the 
Buddha concedes to the possibility of such concepts as being 
and non-being, birth and death, caused and causing, etc. Vyava­
hara belongs to our ordinary life where rules the principle of 
individuation, ancl as long as the relative and provisionary ex­
istence of maya is permitted, common parlance too has to be 
given authority for practical purposes. When the sutra, how­
ever, goes on further down explaining the characteristic features 
of the Paratantra form of knowledge, the terms, Samvritti and 
Paramartha, occur—the former as leading to particularity ancl 
the latter as a psychical state when this is transcended. The 
1 Meaning “usage,” or “worldly way.” P. 85.
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gatha on page 130 S. seems to throw some light on what is 
meant by the Parikalpita and the Paratantra form of knowledge 
and also on their relationship to the Madhyamika conception 
of Samvritti-satya. But the stanzas1 are very complicated in 
meaning and difficult to get at, exactly and in full. But the 
main idea seems to be this: Mind is set in motion when it 
allows itself to be conditioned by the principle of individuation. 
Parikalpita and Paratantra follow from this stirring up of 
mentation. Paratantra is intellectual, for it operates depending 
upon something outside itself. It is a kind of representation. 
It may not be always correct, but it does not create anything 
out of itself. Parikalpita, on the other hand, weaves out its 
own imaginative world regardless of its objective value. It is 
always in the wrong not only in the logical sense but psycho­
logically. The main point about it is that it discriminates “me 
and mine” from what is not “me and mine,” and holding this 
distinction to be real and final, gets itself attached to it, which 
culminates in moral egotism. When this is once asserted, all the 
evils follow that are to be found in connection with life. Para­
tantra which may be innocent in itself becomes the most efficient 
hand-maicl to Parikalpita. and what is created by it is also 
intellectually confirmed with all its practical ’consequences. 
Paratantra and Parikalpita are mutually dependent. Pari- 
nishpanna is to go beyond both these forms of knowledge. This 
is Paramartha, the highest transcendental wisdom, while the 
Samvritti form of truth prevails in the world of Parikalpita. 
and Paratantra.
1 P. 130 it.
1 P. 122.
The two kinds of Buddhi (knowledge)2 which are elsewhere 
distinguished in the sutra may be considered to correspond to 
Samvritti and Paramartha. Buddhi is a higher power of reason­
ing, but it also denotes any form of intelligence. The first is 
called Pravicaya-buddhi, which is a kind of absolute knowledge 
corresponding to the Parinislipanna. Pravicaya means “to 
search through,” “to examine thoroughly,” and the Buddhi so 
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qualified penetrates into the fundamental nature of all things 
which is above logical analysis and cannot be described with 
any of the four propositions (catushkotika). The second Buddhi 
is called Pratislithapika, that is, intelligence that sets up all 
kinds of distinction over a world of appearances, making one’s 
mind attached to them as real. Thus it may establish rides of 
reasoning whereby to give judgments to a world of particulars. 
It is logical knowledge, it is what regulates our ordinary life. 
But as soon as something is established (pratislithdpita) in order 
to prove it, that is, as soon as a proposition is made, it sets up 
something else at the same time and goes on to prove itself 
against that something else. There is nothing absolute in this.
This setting-up or establishing is elsewhere designated as 
Samaropa.1 The Lankavatara distinguishes four of such estab­
lishments: (1) to establish characteristic marks (lakshana) 
where there are none, (2) to establish definite views (drishta} 
where there are none, (3) to establish a cause (/ietu) where 
there is none, and (4) to establish a substance (fbhdva) where 
there is none. Owing to these propositions definitely held up 
as true, opposite ones will surely rise and there will take place 
a wrangling or controversy (apavdcla} between the opposing 
parties. The sutra thus advises the Bodhisattva to avoid these 
one-sided views in order to come to a state of enlightenment 
which is beyond the positive as well as the negative way of view­
ing the world.
1 P. 70.
2 P. 68.
The Twofold Non-atman Theory
We now come to a third distinctive feature of the philo­
sophy of the Lankavatara, which is known as the twofold non­
Atman theory, i.e., Nairatmyadvaya.1 2 The non-Atman or non­
ego theory is known among all Buddhist students as the most 
differentiating mark of Buddhism, but the denial of an Atman 
or self-substance in external objects is the specific property of 
the Mahayana and may require some explanation. To translate
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atman always by “ego,” or “self,” or “soul” may not be right; 
especially when its denial is applied to an objective world, 
egolessness has no meaning, it is merely the source of misappre­
hension. An Atman means something substantial in possession 
of a number of qualities, and a free agent not bound by the 
principle of relativity. When its existence, therefore, is denied 
in us, it means that we have no such free agent within our­
selves, enjoying a substantial existence even above the concatena­
tion of cause and effect. When we deny its reality in the world 
external to us, it means that there is no self-substance (svabhava) 
in individual objects which come into existence, abide for a 
while, and finally disappear according to certain laws. In this 
case, nairdtmya is nihsvabhciva, and when it is understood in 
this way, the idea falls in harmoniously with the other views 
maintained by Mahayanists. Though not yet formulated 
numerically by Buddhist scholars, there are four distinguishing­
marks in Mahayana ontology which constitute its very kernel. 
They are: (1) that all things are empty (sunyata'), (2) unborn 
(anutpadab), (3) not dual (advaita), and (4) without self­
substance (nihsvabhdva)-1 This sums up the metaphysical 
aspect of Mahayanism, and the dual non-Atman theory is 
merely a partial recapitulation of it.
The Lankavatara explains the theory in the following­
manner:2 The Skandhas, Dhatus, and Ayatanas have nothing­
personal in them, there is no “me and mine” in them, they are 
created by the ignorant affirmation of the desire to have, and 
attachment takes place when they are comprehended by the senses. 
The material world as well as the physical body are manifesta­
tions of the mind known as Alaya-vijnana, and when they are 
discriminated as particular existences, we are discriminating our 
own mind-made. They are in constant transmigration, they 
never remain even for a moment as they are, they flow like a 
stream, they change like a seed, they flicker like a candle-light, 
they move like a wind or a cloud. And when affections are 
stirred up, they are pursued by us, we behave like the monkey
1 Pp. 73, 188, etc. J’. 68 fl.
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or the fly that runs after filthy food, not knowing when to get 
satiated, and evidently to no good purpose, we burn like fire. 
Due to the habit-energy (vdsana) accumulated since time im­
memorial through wrong reasoning and attachment, we now 
transmigrate from one state to another revolving like a wheel, 
like a machine, like a phantom creation, or like a walking ghost. 
When we realise this, we are said to have the knowledge 
of the non-existence of an individual ego-soul (puclgal ancti- 
rdtmya-jnanam').
Dhannanairatmya-jnanam, as I said before, is gained by 
extending the knowledge of the non-existence of an individual 
ego-soul to the external world. The two ideas are inter-related, 
and when the one is asserted the other follows inevitably. To 
say that all objects are devoid of self-substance is to recognise 
a most complicated system of relationship running through ex­
istence. This was noticed by the Buddha himself when he dis­
coursed on the Chain of Origination, but as his immediate 
interest was to free his disciples from ignorance and attach­
ment, his statement stopped short at the psychology of non-ego. 
With the growth of Buddhist experience and thought, the psy­
chology developed into metaphysics, and the doctrine of Sunvata 
(emptiness) came to occupy the minds of the Mahayanists. 
And this doctrine is another way of saying that all objects are 
without self-substance. When the theory of relativity is once 
established, all these stock ideas of Manayana Buddhism are 
necessary inferences: Sunyata, Dharmanatniya, Nihsvabhava, 
Anutpada, Anahbasa, Nirvana, Mayopama, etc.
The denial of self-substance means that just as the Skandhas, 
Dhatus, Ayatanas are devoid of ego-soul and have no other 
creator than the desire to have which expresses itself in deeds, 
thereby subjecting itself to an endless concatenation of cause 
and effect, so all things that are in nature above such categories 
as particularity and universality are distinguished as concrete 
individuals only through the wrong discrimination which is so 
intensely cherished by the ordinary mind. The wise are not 
confused, however, they are free from unwarranted inferences 
and attachments, as they know, by rightly reviewing the world 
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of particulars (sarvadh(trma'), that the latter is devoid of mind 
(citta)., will (j/umas), intelligence (manovijndna'), the five 
Dharmas, and Self-substance (svabhava).1 When this is at­
tained, the knowledge concerning the absence of Atman in all 
things is attained. “To be devoid of mind, etc.,” means that 
the real nature of existence cannot be designated by any cate­
gory of thought, for to be predicated means to be determined, 
to be limited. The truth, if it is really something that gives 
complete satisfaction to the yearnings of our religious conscious­
ness, must be absolute, and to be absolute and thoroughly con­
vincing such truth must be innerly experienced. When an 
appeal is made to logic, a statement or proposition is to be proved 
according to rules of thought, and these rules are sure to be con­
ditional, and, therefore, more or less one-sided and prejudicial. 
Yet when the Mahayanists have to say somewhat either to assert 
or to deny, they run the risk of being judged by rules of thought, 
and perhaps all that they can establish in the circumstances 
is to say that all things are “devoid of mind, will, etc.” as 
above referred to. This is where Mahayana philosophers are 
always in a quandary.
1 P. 69.
To apply the term, “Atman,” ego or soul, not only to a 
person {pvdyala') but to all inanimate objects may sound strange 
at first sight as was stated above, but when it is realised that 
Buddhist philosophy has no special intellectual interest in the 
discussion itself except from the most pragmatical point of view, 
i.e., as concerned with life, with this person, witli its salvation 
and enlightenment, the extension of the term “self” or “soul” 
over to all existence seems justified and appropriate. At any 
rate the dual non-ego theory is one of the features of the Maha­
yana as differentiated from the Hinayana.
Ti-ie PsYfiioLOuv of the Buddhist Experience
The Doctrine of Mind-only
Having finished that phase of equipment which may be 
called logical, for the upward career of the Bodhisattva, let 
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us now pass on to the psychological phase, that is, the doctrine 
of consciousness, technically known as the theory of the Eight 
Vijnanas. As I wish to repeat, Buddhism being a religion has 
no abstract interest in logic, or psychology, or metaphysics 
per se, and especially in the case of the Lankavatara the chief 
problem is to reach a state of self-realisation which is the sine 
qua non of Buddhahood, and of Bodhisattvahood as well. All 
efforts are to be directed towards this goal, and it would be 
against the spirit of the sutra to be discussing about the psy­
chology of the Lankavatara. I am doing this simply for the 
benefit of the modern reader who wants to get a better perspec­
tive of the text than in its original confusion.
Psychology is, however, the most difficult part of the Lan- 
kdvatard, and it is not an easy matter to get a clear insight into 
the meaning of it. What I have done here may not be ciuite 
correct as far as the reading of the text, is concerned, and I am 
open to conviction from the hand of a more competent inter­
preter.
Most Buddhist scholars are often too ready to make a too 
sharp distinction between the Madhyamika and the Yogacara 
school, taking the one as exclusively advocating the theory of 
emptiness (silnyatd) while the other is bent single-mindedly 
on an idealistic interpretation of the universe. They thus fur­
ther assume that the idea of emptiness is not at all traceable 
in the Yogacara and that idealism is absent in the Madhyamika. 
This is not exact as a matter of historical fact. Though it is 
impossible just at present to fix the date of the Lankdvatdra 
definitely, we find in it the tendencies that might have developed 
into the Yogacara as well as into the Madhyamika; and these 
tendencies must be regarded as prior to the development of 
these two schools each distinctly claiming its special province 
of interest. The differentiation must have taken place after 
the sutra and not before; for it is natural to infer that composite 
tendencies appear first ancl their decomposition into separate 
ideas and further development each along its specified line.
Whatever this may be, the main point we must never forget 
in the study of the Lankdvatdra is that it is not written as a 
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philosophical treatise to establish a definite system of thought, 
hut to discourse on a certain religious experience. "What philos­
ophy or speculation it offers is only incidental as an introduc­
tion or as an intellectual interpretation necessitated by the 
rational nature of humanity. This latter phase of religious 
experience may be more predominant in Buddhism than in some 
other religions, but it is not for us to miss the essence of the 
matter for the sake of its more or less unimportant accessories, 
however inevitable they may be.
As was definitely stated, the principal theme of the Lan- 
kavatara is Pratyatma-aryajnana-gocara, a state of conscious­
ness in which the inmost truth is directly presented to one’s 
mind. This being an immediate perception of the truth cannot 
be imparted to others by means of logic, but without it the per­
ception itself ceases to be operative, which is the same thing as 
not existing at all or being unreal. The experience in itself is 
without content, and must be given to it by the intellect to make 
it workable in our social living. The psychology of the Lctn- 
kdvatdra is also to be treated thus, that is to say, its doctrine 
of mind-only (cittamatra) with all its accompaniments is meant 
to explain the mental experience of the Bodhisattva. We have 
always to bear this subordinate position of psychology, or logic, 
or metaphysics in the teaching of the Lankavatara.
The doctrine of mind-only is explained in this wise.1
1 P. 46 ff. These gathas are not sometimes quite clear as to their 
meaning. Perhaps the text is to he more thoroughly re-arrangecl, which to 
a certain extent the author holies to do later.
“As the waves of the ocean depending on the wind are. 
stirred up and roll on dancing without interruption ;
“So the Alaya-flood constantly stirred up by the wind of 
Vishaya [principle of individuation] rolls on dancing with the 
waves of various Vijnanas,
“'Dark blue and red, and salt, conch-shell, milk, and honey; 
fragrance, fruits, and flowers; rays of light and the sun—they 
are neither different nor not-different one from another; so the 
seven Vijnanas which are the waves of the ocean rise in con­
junction with mind (citta),
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“Manifold are the waves evolved in the ocean; likewise 
indeed the Alaya sets in motion a variety of Vijnanas.
“Citta, Manas, and [Mano-]' vijnana are spoken of [as 
different] because of appearances; in fact the eight [Vijnanas] 
have no specifically qualifying marks: there is neither that which 
qualifies nor that which is qualified.
“As there is no differentiation in the waves of the ocean, 
so no modification obtains in Citta as regards the Vijnanas.
“Citta gathers up karma, Manas inspects, the Vijnana dis­
tinguishes, and the five Vijnanas discriminate the visible 
[world].
“Dark blue, and red, and such-like are known to be due 
to the Vijnana of mankind, and tell me, 0 Mahamuni, how a 
likeness obtains between waves and mind (citta').
“Dark blue and red and such-like are indeed not in the 
waves, and it is for the sake of the ignorant that mind is 
described as evolving due to appearances.
“There is no evolving in mind, mind in itself is free from 
that which is perceived; where there is that which is perceived 
there is that which perceives; the case is the same with the waves.
“The body, property, and abode are known to be due to the 
Vijnana of mankind, in which an evolution is observed; the 
analogy holds good with the waves.
‘ ‘ The ocean with the dancing waves is discernible, and like­
wise why is not the evolution of the Alaya perceived by intel­
ligence ?
“In accordance with the intelligence and discrimination of 
the ignorant, the Alaya is compared to the ocean, and the like­
ness of waves and the evolution [of mind] are pointed out by a 
simile.
“Thou who illuminest the world like the sun that shines 
equally above and below, announce the truth for the sake of the 
ignorant!
“Thyself the master of all kinds of teaching, why dost thou 
not announce the truth? If thou dost not announce the truth, 
the truth may disappear from the mind.
“As the waves are stirred on the ocean, as images are seen 
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in the mirror, in a dream, simultaneously,, so is the mind in its 
own field.
“To discriminate objects, an evolution takes place in succes­
sion: the Vijnana distinguishes, and Manas reflects upon.
“The visible world manifests itself to the five Vijiianas; 
there is no successive evolution when mind is in a state of col­
lectedness.
“As a painter or his disciple arrays his colours in order 
to produce a painting, so do I preach: the picture is not in the 
colour, nor in the canvas, nor in the vessel.
“In order to attract all beings, the picture is produced in 
colours; preaching may err, and the truth is indeed beyond 
words.
“Being the master of all kinds of teaching, I preach the 
truth to my followers, and the truth is to be attained by an 
inner perception, as it goes beyond both the distinguished 
[object] and the distinguishing [subject].
“I preach for the sake of sons of the Buddha, this preach­
ing is not for the ignorant; the manifoldness of things is seen 
as like Maya, and exists not.
“Preaching is thus done in various ways, subject to errors; 
when the preaching is not in good accord [with the mentality 
of the hearer], it is then for him no preaching.
“A good physician administers medicine according to his 
patients; so indeed do Buddhas discourse in accordance with 
the mentality of beings.
“The masters thus preach the state of consciousness attained 
by their inner perception, which does not belong to the realm 
of philosophers and Sravakas.”
According to the Lankavatara, the mind, inclusive of Citta, 
Manas, and other six Vijhanas, is in its original nature (svdb- 
hava) quiet, pure, and above the dualism of subject and object. 
But here appears the principle of particularisation known as 
Visliaya, which comes from wish, meaning “to act,” “to work”; 
and, stirred by this wind of action, the waves are seen over the 
tranquil surface of the mind. It is now differentiated or evolves 
(vritti) into eight Vijhanas: Alaya, Manas, Manovijnana, and 
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the five senses; and simultaneously with this evolution the whole 
universe comes into existence with its multitudinous forms and 
with its endless entanglements. The following' is indeed the con­
stant echo reververating in the sutra:
“The visible [world] which is mind does not exist [as 
such] ; mind is set in motion by being seen [i.e., objectified] ; 
the body, property and the abode are the manifestations of the 
Alaya which belongs to mankind.
“Citta, Manas, and Manovijnana, Self-nature, the five 
Dharmas, the two forms of Nairatmya (egolessness), purity— 
these are elucidated by the Buddhas.
“Long and short and such-like come to exist mutually con­
ditioned ; not-to-be grows effective by to-be and to-be by not-to-be.
“When things are analysed into atoms, there remains noth­
ing to be discriminated as objects. Those who hold wrong views 
do not believe in the ever-abiding ground where the mind-only 
[doctrine is established],
‘ ‘ The masters point out the state of consciousness attainable 
by their inner perception, which goes indeed beyond the mental 
calibre of the philosophers and Sravakas.”1
1 P. 54.
The Important Terms Explained
Before going further, it may be desirable to explain the 
more important technical terms constantly used in Buddhist 
psychology.
As is seen here, the conception of the Alaya-vijfiaim plays 
a chief, though silent, role in the evolution of the idealistic 
philosophy of the Lankavatara. It is often called simply 
“Citta,” or “Tathagata-garbha.” Alaya means a storage-house 
(tsang, in Chinese) where all kinds of goods are kept in
storage, and it is the Alaya-vijnana’s function to store up all 
the memory (vasana) of one’s thoughts, affections, desires, and 
deeds. Citta which is used as a synonym of the Alaya may be 
translated “mind” as distinguished from Manas, that is, in its 
more specific sense. Citta comes from ci, which has two senses, 
260 THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
(1) “to gather,” “to pile,” “to acquire,” ancl (2) “to per­
ceive,” “to look for.” Citta, therefore, may mean either “col­
lection” or “thought,” and in the present case, that is, when 
it is identified with the Alaya, Buddhist scholars take it in the 
sense of accumulation. So we read in the Lankdvatdra, “Citta 
gathers up karma.”1 Ordinarily, it may correctly be rendered 
“thought,” or “mind.” The great source of confusion, how­
ever, comes from Citta being used frequently for the whole 
system of Vi.j lianas as well as for the Alaya.
1Pp. 47, 158.
Vijndna is one of the significant terms in Buddhism, and it is 
difficult to have one English word for it. Jna means “to know,” 
“to perceive,” but Vijnana in Buddhism lias a technical sense; 
it is not mere understanding, it is a sort of principle of con­
scious life as distinguished from the body, and it is also the 
power or faculty of discrimination. It has however essentially 
an intellectual connotation, faithfully retaining its original sense. 
In the case of Alaya-vijnana, there is no discrimination in it, 
no intellection; for it simply accumulates all the impressions, 
all the memory-seeds (MJa) that are produced and left behind 
by the activities of the other Vijnanas.
Tathdgata-garbha, which is another name for the Alaya, 
is also a sort of store-room or receptacle where the seeds of 
Tathagatahood are retained and matured. It has a religious 
shade of meaning in contradistinction to Alaya-vijfiana which 
is a more philosophical term. Garbha is generally done into 
tsang in Chinese, same as alaya, but literally it means “womb” 
(#ai g§). It is strange that the Chinese translators never, as 
far as I know, rendered tathdgata-garbha by but always
except when in the Sliingon sect the Garbha-kosa-dliatu 
(Bnzf^W-) 1S spoken of as contrasting to the Vajradhatu (SjiJJ??-). 
But the meaning is clear because the Tathagata-garbha is the 
womb where Tathagatas are conceived and matured, and as we 
are all possible Tathagatas except that we sit generally so tightly 
wrapped up under the heavy intellectual and affective coverings 
known as Jneyavarana, and Klesavarana, the intellectual and the 
affective obstruction.
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Manas (from man), meaning “to think,” “to imagine,” 
“to intend,” is that seat of intellection ancl conation, correspond­
ing to the Western conception of mind. It is the one term in 
Buddhist psychology that has no vijnana attached at its end. It 
is often confused, and justifiably with Manovijnana which is one 
of the six Vijnanas recognised by all the schools of Buddhism. 
In the Lankavatdra Manas occupies a definite position and per­
forms a specific function in the hierarchy of psychical ac­
tivities, which will be described later. Manovijnana like the 
other five Vijnanas has a field of its own as the perceiving of the 
rationality of things internal as well as external. The Cakshur- 
vijnana is meant for the visibility of things, the Srotra-vijnana 
for their audibility, and so on. The Manovijnana functions 
sometimes independently of the five Vijnanas and sometimes 
simultaneously ancl conjointly with them. To a certain extent, 
it may be considered equivalent to the intellect, while Manas is 
conative and affective besides being intellectual. Therefore, it is 
sometimes called Klishtamanas, meaning “Manas in defilement.” 
The spiritual defilement starts nowhere else but in this Manas, 
the root of intellection and conation.
When the sutra says that all things are mind-only, citta- 
mdtram, what is meant by it? Does Citta refer to the Alaya, 
or to the whole system of Vijnanas, or to the interaction of the 
Alaya and the Manas?
When it is said that Citta is under the bondage of Vishaya, 
cittam vishaya-sambandham,1 or that bondage is mind-made, 
bandhanam citta-sambhavam,1 what is meant by this Citta?
1 For instance, p. 130.
2 P. 55
What does the phrase, svacittadrisyamdtra, (the-seen-only- 
by-one’s-own-mind), or cittavikalpalakshana (appearances-dis- 
criminated-by-mind), really refer to, which occurs so frequently 
throughout the LankavatdraI
When mention is made of “purifying the outflow of the 
visible world from one’s own mind” (svacittadrityadhardvisud- 
dhi),1 2 what is this mind?
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Ill my view, Citta or mincl refers in some cases to the Alaya 
alone, in other cases to Manas, or even to the whole system of 
Vijnanas. When the sutra says that if there is no turning 
(pardvritti) of the Alaya-vijnana called by the name of Tatha­
gata-garbha, there will be no extinction of the seven functioning 
Vijnanas,1 or that the Tathagata-garbha is united with the seven 
Vijnanas, from attachment arises a dualism, and when thorough­
ly perceived this is removed,1 2 vie realise that the Alava is the 
most important conception on which the whole mechanism of the 
psychic life hangs. Mind-only (cittamdtram') must then mean 
dlayavijnanamatram. In fact the Alaya is a depository of all 
kinds of karma-seeds, good as well as bad,3 and so long as it is 
not stirred up by Vishaya, the principle of individuation, it will 
stay quiet, retaining its original purity4 or neutrality, ineffici­
ency, aloofness, and the primary quality of not being con­
taminated by defilements. However, the Alaya is always found 
in company with the seventh Vijnana, or Manas,3 and when it is 
found at all working, all the other Vijnanas are found in action.0 
This being the case, “mind-only” may also involve the whole 
mental apparatus, especially with the Alaya strongly in alliance 
with Manas.
1 P. 221.
- P. 223.
3 Tathagata-garbha mahamate kusala-akusala-hetukah. P. 220; see 
also p. 242.
4 Anyanta-prakriti-parisuddhi. P. 222.
3 P. 220.
G p 221.
It may be more appropriate to consider Citta designating 
the whole system of Vijnanas as a unit, instead of looking at 
each Vijnana as an independent yet interrelating element. The 
whole mind is then conceived as operating or functioning in eight 
different modes, while each mode also shares in the general ac­
tivity of the mind either as Citta or Vijnana. Unless Citta is 
especially referred to as distinguished from Manas and the 
Vijnanas, we can safely state that Citta, when mentioned in­
dependently in such phrases as cittamdtram, svacittadrisyam, or
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cittamdtravinirmuktam nopalabhyate, means the whole system of 
conscious life which is generally designated as mind by Western 
philosophers. For instance, we have in the T'ang version the fol­
lowing verse corresponding to the gatha in the Sanskrit text, 
p. 70 :
“The body, property, and the abode—
These are no other than the shadow of the mind;
The ignorant, unable to understand it,
Are engaged in theory-making and in controversy.
But what they establish is merely mind-made,
And outside mind nothing is obtainable.”
In this quotation Citta (mind) no doubt stands for the totality 
of the Vijnana system. Indeed when the Alaya is separated 
from its company, it ceases to work, that is, to exist, and we have 
nothing left here except the name.
The doctrine expounded in the Lankavatara and also 
in the Avatamsaka Sutra is known as “ Citta-matra” and 
never as “ Vijiianamatra” or “Vijnaptimatra” as in the 
Yogacara school of Asanga and Vasubandhu. As far as the 
idealistic way of looking at the world is concerned, both systems 
have something in common; especially the Lankavatara may 
be interpreted more or less consistently by means of the 
Yogacara psychology, and indeed this has been frequently at­
tempted by scholars. But as is the case with Asvaghosha’s 
Awakening of Faith the Lankavatara differs from the Yogacara 
in one important point, that is, while the latter maintains that 
the Alaya is absolutely pure and has nothing to do with defile­
ments and evil passions, the Lankavatara and Asvaghosha main­
tain the view that the Tathagata-garbha or the Alaya is the 
storage of the impure as well as the pure, that it is both 
immanent and transcendental, both relative and absolute.
The Evolution of the Vijnana System
The whole Vijnana system is explained in the Lankavatara 
from various points of view which are very difficult to present 
adequately in another language in which there is no tradition of 
thought corresponding to the Indian or Buddhist way of think­
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ing. I hope the following interpretation of mine has not 
altogether misrepresented the original conceptions of the Lan- 
kavcttara.
The Vijnana system is describable from three points of 
reference: its evolution, its modes of being, and its function.
By evolution is meant the rise (utpacla), abiding (sthiti), 
and disappearance (nirodha) of the Vijnana.1 Of this there 
are two forms, Prabandha and Lakshana. Prabandha, meaning 
incessant continuation, is concerned with an uninterrupted ac­
tivity of the Vijnana, while Lakshana (or external mark) means 
its manifested aspect. When the habit-energy (vasana) stored 
up in the Alava by the imprints left behind by thinking, feeling, 
willing, and acting, either good or bad, is destroyed, there will 
be no visible signs of them left. This is called the destruction or 
disappearance of the Vijnana as to their Lakshana. When not 
only the cause of the subject (asraya') in dependence of which 
the Vijnanas can function, but that which supports them (alam- 
lyana'), or that which provides them with material, are removed, 
there will be no more continuation of activity in the Vijnanas. 
This is the case of disappearance both with the Prabandha and 
with the Lakshana.of the Vijnanas, and the same conditions will 
also hold good with their rise and abiding-on. But as the sutra 
does not give any further explanation concerning the difference 
between, for instance, the disappearance of the Prabandha and 
that of the Lakshana, the above statement is not enough to 
show why this distinction between the two is necessary, not only 
logically but psychologically; for the difference specified above 
does not seem to be sufficiently warranted. All that we can 
gather from this is that there is Vasana amassed in the Alaya, 
which acts as cause to the other Vijnanas, and that there is 
another thing which serves as object to the latter, and, finally, 
that by the interaction that goes on between subject and object 
all the Vijnanas grow either active or dormant according to the 
case.
i P. 37 ff.
The one most important conception in the system of Vij- i
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lianas is Vasana. What is this? Psychologically, Vasana is 
.memory, for it is something left after a deed is done, mental or 
physical, and it is retained and stored up in the Alaya as a sort 
of latent energy ready to get in motion. This memory or habit­
energy or habitual perfuming is not neces­
sarily individual; the Alaya being super-individual holds in it 
not only individual memory but all that has been experienced 
by sentient beings. When the sutra says that in the Alaya is 
found all that has been going on since beginningless time sys­
tematically stored up as a kind of seed, this does not refer to 
individual experiences, but to something general, beyond the in­
dividual, making up in a way the background on which all 
individual psychic activities are reflected. Therefore, the Alaya 
is originally pure, it is the abode of Tathagatahood, where no 
defilements of the particularising intellect and affection can 
reach; purity in terms of logic means universality and defilement 
or sin means individuation, from which attachments of various 
forms are derived. In short, that, the world starts from memory, 
that memory in itself as retained in the Alaya universal is no 
evil, and that when we are removed from the influence of false 
discrimination the whole Vijnana system woven around the 
Alaya as centre experiences a turning (pardvritti),—this is the 
gist of the teaching of the Lankavatara.
This turning marks the culmination of the practical psy­
chology of the Lankavatara, for it is through this fact that the 
realisation of Pratyatma-aryajnana-gocara is possible, and this 
realisation is the central theme of the discourse. As this event 
takes place in the Alaya, or what is the same thing, in the Tatha- 
gata-garbha, which is the basis of all things, it is known as 
dsraya-paravritti, a turning at the basis. Asraya means that on 
which anything is dependent, and in this case the Alaya is the 
asraya on which hangs the working of the Vijiianas and con­
sequently the birth (utpada') of the whole universe. The turn­
ing takes place when the ego-centric and evil-creating discrimina­
tion based upon the dualism of subject and object ceases by 
realising that there is no external world besides what is perceived 
within oneself, and this realisation is effected by the cultivation 
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of the intellect known as non-cliscriminative ancl transcendental 
(nirvikalpa-lokottara-jnanam). As long as our ordinary under­
standing which works dualistically conditioned prevails, we 
cannot go beyond the realm controlled by the seven Vijfianas, 
and if we cannot go beyond this, we have no chance to penetrate 
into the reality of things (dharmata), which means an everlast­
ing transmigration in the world of birth and death. We must 
look now in the opposite direction, towards the cpiarter where no 
Vikalpa takes place, ancl where no evolution (uritfi) of the 
Vijfianas has set in. An opening must be macle to the non- 
cliscriminative ancl transcendental intellect. The opening is the 
turning. The eye that used to open to the external world think­
ing it was reality and egotistically’ attached to it, now turns 
within to see what lies here. It is in this inner world that so 
many things we have been looking after are accessible now: 
the Inner Perception (p. 62), Nirvana (pp. 62, 98, 238, etc.). 
Tathata (p. 108), Emancipation (moksha, p. 233), Prajnapara­
mita (p. 238), the cessation of the seven Vijfianas (p. 221), etc.
This turning is in a sense re-turning as the Alaya or Tatha- 
gata-garbha returns by this to its original purity (sucldha), 
happiness (sieAVm), and eternal nature which is above pravritti 
and nivritti (rise ancl disappearance).1 The Alaya gets con­
taminated by’ external impurities (dgantu-klesa') amassed by all 
kinds of philosophising (vitarkadarsana') which is based on the 
discrimination of subject ancl object. When the discrimination is 
in the right direction, it is all right, for it points towards the 
returning; but when it goes astray’ as is the case with every­
one of us, the unenligtened, it stirs up all sorts of trouble, not 
only’ intellectually’ but affectively, the latter being the worst of 
all trouble-makers. As Buddhism like other Indian systems of 
thought puts the first, emphasis on intellectual integrity, the 
right seeing into the situation performs the most important 
office in the whole programme of Buddhist, experience. When 
the intellectual outlook gets distorted, the affective ancl conative 
disturbances follow, which in turn react upon the essential purity 
1 P. 222,
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of the Alaya ancl contaminates it thoroughly. Incorrectness 
in every form is described by Buddhists in terms of chromatics. 
Hence the Alaya is dyed (upaklishta) by external impurities. 
Klesa is generally translated in Buddhism OJ'Hn, “tormenting 
and afflicting,” “causing vexations of spirit,” but here in the 
Lankdvatdra it is done by g£, “dust” or “impurity” as it spoils 
the immaculate Alaya. And since this dust is not native to the 
Alaya, it is called agatu, the “guest” who is uninvited.1
1 p. 222.
2 P. 37 ft.
The Three Modes of the Vijnana
The Vijnanas may be described from their modes of being, 
that is, from the lakshana point of view: there are three signs 
from which their being may be approached. The first is the 
Vijnana as evolving (pravritti'), the second the Vijnana as 
producing definite effects (karma), and the third the Vijnana 
as remaining in its original nature (jdti).1 The Pravritti- 
vijnana is a collective name for all the particular Vijnanas that 
evolve out of the Alaya, when they are considered from the 
point of view of evolution, while the Alaya is the Vijnana or 
Citta that remains undisturbed in its native abode. The Karnia- 
vijnana describes the Vijnana in its functioning capacity. The 
Vijnana in itself does not show any signs of becoming; but 
these three aspects belong to one Citta; thus they are, as the 
sutra says, “neither different nor not-different.”
The following extracts may give us some ideas as to what 
is meant by the Pravritti-vijiiana and its relations to the other 
aspects of the Vijnana.
“As atoms of clay and a lump of clay are neither different 
nor not-different from each other, so are gold and ornament 
made of it. If, 0 Mahamati, a lump of clay is different from its 
atoms, nothing will be produced out of them, but as something 
is produced out of them, they are not different. But if they 
are identical, not different, no distinction is possible between 
atoms of clay and the lump. Likewise, 0 Mahamati, if the 12
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evolved Vijiianas are different from the Alaya each in its 
original nature, the Alaya will not be their primary cause. If 
they are identical, the disappearance of the Vijiianas will be 
the disappearance of the Alaya, but there is no disappearance 
of their own original nature. Thus, 0 Mahamati, there is no dis­
appearance of the original nature of the Vijiianas, but only the 
disappearance of the karma-aspect of the Vijiianas. If, however, 
their own original nature should disappear, the Alaya itself 
would disappear. With the disappearance of the Alaya, the 
distinction will cease to exist between the Buddhist doctrine 
and the nihilism of some philosophers. According to the latter, 
when the comprehension of an external world ceases, the Vij­
iianas cease to continue, their uninterrupted activity since 
beginningless time will be broken. 0 Mahamati, the philosopers 
may explain an uninterrupted evolution [of the Vijiianas] 
by a cause, and do not say that the evolution is produced by 
the united action of the eye-sense with form and light. They 
assume another cause; the cause is Pradhana (unevolved 
nature), Purusha (supreme spirit), Isvara (supreme lord), time, 
or atom.”1
1 Pp. 38-39.
“0 Mahamati, the eve-sense (vijnana') is awakened by four 
causes (karana). What are the four? Getting attached to the 
visible world not knowing that it is mind-made (1) ; tenaciously 
clinging to form due to the habit-energy of unwarranted specula­
tions and erroneous views since beginningless time(2) ■ the self- 
nature of the Vijnana itself (3) ■ and eagerness for the multi- 
tudinosity of forms and appearances (4). 0 Mahamati, owing
to these four causes, the waves of the evolving Vijiianas are 
set in motion in the Alaya which flows like the waters in the 
midst of the ocean. 0 Mahamati, as the eye-sense, so [with 
the other senses, the perception of] the objective world takes 
place simultaneously and regularly [i.e., constantly] in all the 
sense-organs, atoms, and pores; it is like the mirror’s reflecting­
images, and, 0 Mahamati, like the wind-tossed ocean, the ocean 
of mind is blown over by the wind of objectivity (vishaya) 
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and the [vijnana-] waves are raging without interruption. The 
cause and the manifestations of its action are not separated the 
one from the other; and on account of the karma-aspect of the 
Vijnana being tightly united with the original-aspect, the self­
nature of form [or objective world, rilpasvabhava] is not ac­
curately ascertained, and, 0 Mahamati, thus evolves the system of 
the five Vijnanas. When together, 0 Mahamati, with these five 
Vijnanas, the objective world is regarded as the reason of dif­
ferentiation (panic ch ecl a] and its appearances are defined, we 
have Manovijnana. Caused by this, there takes place the birth of 
the body. They do not, however, think within themselves that 
‘we, mutually dependent, come to get attached to the visible 
world which grows out of one’s own mind and is discriminated 
by it.’ ”1
1 P. 44.
2 P. 37.
The Functions of the Eight- Vijnanas
From the functional point of view, there are eight Vijnanas : 
Alaya, Manas, Manovijnana, and the five; but they may be 
grouped under two headings: Khyati-vijnana and Vastu-prati- 
vikalpa-vijnana. Khydti, from hhya, means “to perceive,” 
“to manifest,” and this function of the Vijnana is to perceive 
or to reflect things that appear in front of it just as the mirror 
reflects all forms before it.1 2 This is the office of the Alaya. It 
looks into itself where all the memory (vdsana) of the beginning­
less part is preserved in a way beyond thought (acintya) and 
ready for further evolution (parinama'); but it has no active 
energy in itself, it never acts, it simply perceives, it is in this 
respect exactly like a mirror; it is again like the ocean perfectly 
smooth with no waves disturbing its tranquillity; and it is pure 
and undefiled, which means that it is free from the dualism of 
subject and object. For it is the pure act of perceiving, with 
no differentiation yet of the knowing one and the known. The 
waves, however, will be seen ruffling the surface of the ocean of 
Alaya-vijnana when the principle of individuation known as 
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Vishaya (!»'$■) blows over it like the winch The waves thus 
started are this world of particulars where the intellect dis­
criminates, the affection clings, and passions and desires struggle 
for existence and supremacy.
This particularising agency sits within the system of Vij­
nanas and is known as Manas; in fact it is when Manas begins 
to operate that a system of the Vijnanas manifests itself. They 
are thus called “object-cliscriminating-vijnana” (vastu-prativi- 
kalpa-vijncma). Manas’ function is essentially to reflect upon 
the Alaya and to create and to discriminate subject and object 
from the pure oneness of the Alaya. The memory accumulated 
(c-iyute) in the latter is now divided (victyate') into dualities of 
all forms and all kinds. This is compared to the manifoldness 
of waves that are now stirring up the ocean. Manas is an evil 
spirit in one sense and a good one in another, for discrimination 
in itself is not evil, is not necessarily always false judgment 
(abhuta-parikalpa) or wrong reasoning (prapaiica-daushthulya). 
It grows to be the source of great calamity when it creates 
desires based upon its wrong judgments, such as when it believes 
in the reality of an ego-substance and gets attached to it as 
the ultimate truth. For Manas is not only discriminating in­
telligence, but willing agency, and consequently actor.
In these activities Manas is always found in company with 
the Manovijnana. In fact, it may be more proper to say that 
Manas and Manovijnana conjointly working produce the world 
of particulars, and when reference is made to Vastuprativikalpa- 
vijnana it includes both Manas and Manovijnana. The func­
tion of Manovijnana is by hypothesis to reflect on Manas, as 
the eve-vijnana reflects on the world of forms and the ear- 
vijnana on that of sounds; but in fact as soon as Manas evolves 
the dualism of subject and object out of the absolute unity of 
the Alaya, Manovijnana and indeed all the other Vijnanas as 
well, begin to operate.1 It is like a complicated machine now, 
the whole system of the Vijnanas, each singly and also con­
jointly with others, is set in motion. When the system is thus 
1 P. 44.
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of salvation, or upon whom any kind of benefit may be bestowed. 
From the absolutely idealistic point of view, we may even ask if 
life is at all worth living. Is it not really much ado for nothing 
that the Bodhisattva should try to save the world when the latter 
is no more than mere illusion of his own mind ? This is what 
is called by the Mahayanists uccheda-darsanam (nihilism) and 
does not understand yathabhutam the truth of things. That 
the world is like a mirage, thus that it is empty, does not mean 
that it is unreal in the sense that it has no reality in whatever 
way. But it means that its real nature cannot be understood 
by a mind that cannot rise above the dualism of “to be” and 
“not to be.” Therefore, the Sung translation of the Lankdva­
tdra opens with this stanza recited by Mahamati:
“The world transcends [the dualism of] birth and death, 
it is like the flower in air; the wise are free from [the ideas of] 
being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awaken­
ed [in them].
“All things are like mirage, they are beyond the reach of 
mind and understanding; the wise are free from [ideas of] 
being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened 
[in them].
“The world is beyond nihilism as well as eternalism, and 
it is always like a dream; the wise are free from [ideas of] being 
and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened 
[in them].
“The wise know that there is no self-substance in a person, 
nor in an object, and that both passions and their objectives are 
always pure [in their nature] and have no individual marks; 
and yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].
“There is no Nirvana anywhere, there is no Buddha abiding 
in Nirvana, there is no Nirvana abiding in the Buddha; both 
the enlightened and the enlightening are transcended; ‘to be’ 
and ‘not to be,’ these two are altogether put aside.
“Those who look up to the Buddha thus tranquil and 
detachment-attained, are known as ‘not-seizing, ” they are pure 
now and after. ’ ’
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The Bodhisattva Never Enters into Nirvana-
According to the Lankavatdra there are five orders of beings 
from the religions point of view: (1) Those who belong to 
the Sra.va.ka order, (2) Those of the Pratyekabuddha order, 
(3) Those of the Tathagata order, (4) Those who belong to no 
definite order, and (5) Those who are altogether outside these 
orders.1 Those belong to the Sravaka order who are delighted at 
listening to such doctrines as concern the Skandhas, Dhatus, or 
Ayatanas, but take no special interest in the theory of causation, 
who have cut themselves loose from the bondage of evil passions 
but have not yet destroyed their habit-energy. They have at­
tained to the realisation of Nirvana, abiding in which state they 
would declare that they have put an end to existence, their life 
of morality is now attained, all that is to be done is done, they 
would not be reborn. These have gained an insight into the 
non-existence of an ego-substance in a person but not yet into 
that in objects. Those philosophical leaders who believe in a 
creator or in the ego-soul may also be classed under this order.
1 P. 63 et seq.
The Pratyekabnddha order comprises those who are in­
tensely interested in anything that leads them to the realisation 
of Pratyekabuddhahood. They would retire into solitude and 
have no attachment to things worldly. When they hear that 
the Buddha manifests himself in a variety of forms, sometimes 
in group, sometimes singly, exhibiting miraculous powers, they 
think these are meant for their own order, and immensely 
delighted in them they would follow and accept them.
The Tathagata order may be again divided into three: those 
who gain an insight into the truth that there is no individual 
reality behind what one perceives, those who know that there 
is an immediate perception of the truth in one’s inmost con- 
ciousness, and those who perceive that besides this world there 
are a great number of Buddha-lands wide and far-extending. 
They may listen to discourses on such subjects as manifestations 
of mind, or transcendental realm of the Alaya, from which 
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starts this world of particulars, and yet they may not at all 
feel astonished or frightened. These belong to the order of 
Tathagatas.
The fourth one is of indeterminate nature, for those who 
belong to it may take to either one of the above three orders 
according to their opportunities.
There is still another class of beings which cannot be com­
prised under any of the four already mentioned; for they do 
not have any desire for emancipation, and without this desire 
no religious teaching can enter into any heart. Two sub-classes, 
however, may be distinguished here, those who have forsaken 
all roots of merit, and those who have vowed at the beginning 
to save all beings. They both belong to the Icchantika1 order 
so called. Into the former fall all those who vilify the doctrines 
meant for the Bodhisattvas, saying that they are not in ac­
cordance with the sacred texts, rules of morality, and the doc­
trine of emancipation. Because of this vilification they forsake 
1 This is generally understood to have been derived from icc7id 
“desire.” According to Dr. Unrai Wogiwara, however, it. c-omes originally 
from itthamtvika, or aitthamtvika, meaning “being worldly” or “belong­
ing to this world.” (The NLahavyutpatti, ed. by himself, notes, p. 23.) 
Linguistically, he may he all right, but psychologically there is no harm in 
deriving icchantika from iccha, wish or desire; for the Icchantika are those 
devoted followers of hedonism either in its had or good sense. The Bodhi­
sattva is a hedonist in the good sense, his not entering into Nirvana is his 
own desire or pleasure, he simply desires to remain in this world in order 
to save his fellow-beings from misery, and he does this not from any sense 
of duty or moral desirability; he does this merely from his altruistic 
impulse as it were, that is, he is following the bent of his own mind, 
which is pleasure to him. But in the ease of a sensuous hedonist “he does 
not believe in the law of causality, he has no feeling of shame, he has no 
faith in the working of karma, he is unconcerned with the present, with 
the future, he never befriends good people, he does not follow the teaching 
of the Buddha.” (Quoted by Dr. Wogiwara as the definition of the 
Icchantika given in the Nirvana sutra (the Kyobunkwan edition of the 
Chinese Tripitaka, VII, 96a, 1.9.) As far as the pursuit of pleasure is 
concerned, the hedonist-Bodhisattva and the worldly sensuous hedonist 
belong to the same order as are classified in the Lankavatara.
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i n t o  a  w o r l d  o f  p a r t i c u l a r s .  H i s  v o w s  a r e  t o  b e  f u l f i l l e d ,  a n d  
i n  t h i s  h e  i s  s a i d  t r u l y  t o  b e  a  B o d h i s a t t v a .
T h e  B o d h i s a t t v a  a n d .  S o c i a l  L i f e .
T h e  c e n t r a l  t h e m e  o f  t h e  L a n k d v a t d r a  h a s  b e e n  e x p l a i n e d  
a s  b e i n g  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  a n  i n s i g h t  i n t o  o n e ’ s  i n m o s t  c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s ,  a n d  t o  d o  t h i s  w e  h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  s u t r a  a p p r o a c h e s  
t h e  s u b j e c t  i n  t w o  w a y s ,  l o g i c a l  a n d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l .  B u t  a s  
B u d d h i s m  i s  a  r e l i g i o n  a n d  a s  e v e r y  r e l i g i o n  h a s  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  
a n d  s o c i a l  s i d e ,  w i t h o u t  w h i c h  i t  w i l l  l o s e  i t s  r e a s o n  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  
t h e  L a n k a v a t a r a  a l s o  p r e p a r e s  t h e  B o d h i s a t t v a  f o r  h i s  m i s s i o n  
a s  o n e  o f  t h e  m e m b e r s  o f  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  l i f e .  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  i s  
w ' h a t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  M a h a y a n a  f r o m  t h e  H i n i y a n a ,  f o r  t h e  
l a t t e r ’ s  o b j e c t  o f  s p i r i t u a l  d i s c i p l i n e  d o e s  n o t  e x t e n d  b e y o n d  
h i s  o w n  i n t e r e s t ,  h o w e v e r  e x a l t e d  i t  m a y  b e  i n  i t s e l f . — t h e  o b j e c t  
b e i n g  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  A r h a t s h i p ,  a  s o l i t a r y  s a i n t l y  l i f e .  T h i s  
i s  a l l  w e l l  a s  f a r  a s  i t  g o e s ,  b u t  a s  w e  a r e  a l l  l i v i n g  w i t h i n  
a  m o s t  c o m p l i c a t e l y  o r g a n i s e d  c o m m u n a l  b o d y ,  n o t  e x c e p t i n g  
e v e n  a  B u d d h a  o r  a  B o d h i s a t t v a ,  w e  h a v e  t o  t h i n k  o f  t h i s  s i d e  
o f  l i f e .  T h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  a  B o d h i s a t t v a  w a s  t h u s  i n e v i t a b l e .  
I f  h e  a t t a i n e d  t o  a  s t a t e  o f  s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n  w h i c h  h e  f i n d s  s o  
f u l l  o f  p e a c e ,  b l i s s ,  a n d  s t r e n g t h ,  h i s  n a t u r a l  d e s i r e  i s  t o  i m p a r t  
t h e m  t o  h i s  f e l l o w - b e i n g s .  T e c h n i c a l l y ,  w h e n  h e  h a s  f i n i s h e d  
b e n e f i t t i n g  h i m s e l f  ( d t m a h i t a i n ) .  h i s  n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  g o  o u t  i n t o  
t h e  w o r l d  a n d  b e n e f i t  o t h e r s  { p a r a J i i t u » i ' ‘ .  I n  r e a l i t y ,  h e  c a n n o t  
d o  g o o d  t o  h i m s e l f  w i t h o u t  l e t t i n g  o t h e r s  s h a r e  i n  i t .  T h e  s u t r a ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  n o w  p r o c e e d s  t o  t e l l  t h e  r e a d e r  w h a t  i s  t h e  p r a c t i c a l ,  
i . e . ,  s o c i a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  B o d h i s a t t v a .  I t  m a y  b e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  
o b j e c t  o f  g a i n i n g  a n  i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  i n n e r  t r u t h  o f  t h i n g s  i s  
r e a l l y  t o  q u a l i f y  o n e s e l f  f o r  s o c i a l  w o r k .
B e f o r e  p r o c e e d i n g ,  a  q u e s t i o n  m a y  b e  r a i s e d  a s  t o  t h e  v a l u e  
o f  d o i n g  a n y t h i n g  f o r  o t h e r s  i n a s m u c h  a s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
d o c t r i n e  o f  S v a c i t t a m a t r a m  ( s e l f - m i n d - o n l y ) ,  o r  t o  t h a t  o f  S a r -  
v a d h a r m d n d m .  s r t n y a t d - d n u t p u d a - a c l c a y a - m J i s v a ' b J i d v a - l a k s J i a n a , 1  
t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  o r  n o b o d y  i n  t h e  w o r l d  t h a t  w i l l  b e  t h e  o b j e c t  
1  P .  7 3 .
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in full swing, we cannot distinguish one Vijnana from another, 
they so intimately interact, ancl the mirroring Alaya is not 
distinguishable from the discriminating Manas and from the 
other Vijiianas, reflecting, reasoning, desiring, and acting. The 
Kliyati and the Vastuprativikalpa have now no differentiating 
marks (aWiinnalakshana) they re-act upon each other, the one 
acting in turn as the cause to the other (anyonyahetuks).
In the beginning there was the memory amassed in the 
Alaya since the beginningless past as a latent cause, in which 
the whole universe of individual objects lies with its eyes closed; 
here comes in Manas with its discriminating intelligence, and 
subject is distinguished from object; Manovijnana reflects on 
the duality, and from it issues a whole train of judgments with 
their consequent prejudices and attachments, while the five other 
Vijiianas help them to grow more and more complicated not 
only intellectually but affectively aand conatively.- All the re­
sults of these activities in turn perfume the Alaya stimulating 
the old memory to wake up while the new one finds its affinities 
among the old. In the meantime, however, the Alaya itself 
remains unmoved retaining its identity.
The following extracts from the Lankavatara elucidate for 
us the relation between the Alaya and the other Vijiianas and 
also that between Manovijnana, including Manas, and the re­
maining part of the Vijnana system.
When the Buddha said that Buddhist Nirvana consisted 
in one’s turning away from the wrongfully discriminating 
Manovijnana, Mahamati asked, “0 Blessed One, dost thou not 
establish eight Vijiianas?” Being assured of this, Mahamati 
proceeded, “If this be the case, why dost thou not speak of one’s 
turning away from the seven Vijiianas instead of Mano­
vijnana?” The Buddha answered as follows: “Depending 
upon Manovijnana as the cause, there takes place the evolution 
of seven Vijiianas. Further, 0 Mahamati, when Manovijnana 
clings to an external world of particulars, habit-energy (i>«s«nc7)
1 P. 37.
2 P. 235.
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
is generated therefrom and by this the Alaya is nurtured. 
Together with the thought of ‘me and mine,’ taking hold of it 
and clinging to it, and reflecting upon it, Manas thereby takes 
shape and is evolved. The nature of the substance [however] 
shows no change. Depending upon the Alaya as the cause, an 
external world is tenaciously held as real while it is the mani­
festation of one’s own mind, and thereby the mentation-system, 
mutually related, is evolved in its totality. Just like the ocean­
waves, 0 Mahamati, [the vijnanas], set in motion by the wind 
of an external world which is the manifestation of one’s own 
mind, rise and cease. Therefore, 0 Mahamati, the seven 
Vijnanas cease with the cessation of Manovijnana. Thus it 
is said:
“My Nirvana has nothing to do with Substance (&7idva), 
nor with Action (kriya), nor with Appearance (lakshana) :
“With the cessation of the Vijnana which is caused by dis­
crimination, there is my cessation [i.e., Nirvana].
“Depending upon it as the cause, the whole system of 
mentation finds its refuge here.
“The Vijnana gives the cause to the mind (citta) and is 
its dependant:
“As when the great flood runs its course there are no more 
waves,
“So with the extinction [of Manovijnana] all the Vijnanas 
cease to rise.”1
1 Pp. 126-127.
The above shows the importance of Manovijnana in the 
body of Vijnanas including the Alaya; let us now proceed to 
see what role the Alaya, besides supplying material to the activity 
of Manovijnana, plays, or rather how it stands by itself especially 
in connection with the idea of Tathagata-garbha. The following 
will be of great help to our understanding the significance of 
the Alaya, which is needed in the bringing about of all inner 
experience known as Pratyatmagati:
‘ ‘ 0 Mahamati, the Tathagata-garbha contains in itself causes 
both good and not-good, and from which are generated all paths
THE LANKAVATARA SUTRA 273
of existence. It is like an actor playing different characters 
without harbouring any thought of ‘me ancl mine.’ From not 
comprehending this, there arises the union and interaction of 
three causes producing results. The philosophers not under­
standing this get attached to the fixed idea of a creator. Infused 
with the habit-energy of various kinds of speculations and 
errors which have been carried on since beginningless time, 
the name of Alaya-vijnana obtains, [as alaya means all-conserv­
ing] . It is in company with the seven Vijnanas which are 
generated in the dwelling abode of ignorance. The body [of 
the Vijnanas] is stirred uninterruptedly and all the time like 
the waves of the great ocean, but [the Alaya itself] is free from 
the fault of impermanence and devoid of the thought of ego, 
it is in its ultimate substance perfectly immaculate. As to the 
other seven Vijnanas beginning with Manas and Manovijnana, 
they originate and come to an end and are characterised with 
momentariness; this birth is due to our erroneously discriminat­
ing things that are not; they are intimately related to and 
dependent upon an external world of forms and images; 
tenaciously attached to names and appearances, they fail to 
comprehend that forms and appearances are manifestations 
of one’s own mind; they do not realise what is pain and 
what pleasure, they are no producer of emancipation ; 
firmly standing on names and appearances [as realities], 
they are begotten of the desire to have (rdgra) and further beget 
the same desire; [the desire and the Vijnanas are thus mutually 
conditioning]. When what are known as the perceiving senses 
are destroyed and disappear, others [Vijnanas], immediately 
following this, cease to function. There is [still] a self-dis­
criminating knowledge; and seeing that no pain, no pleasure 
is felt, that there is the extinction of thought and sensation, 
and the attainment of mental tranquillity and the four Dhyanas, 
and a skilfulness in [the understanding of] truth and emancipa­
tion, the devotees {yogin) think that they have [really] attained 
emancipation. But as long as the Alayavijnanq known by the 
name of Tathagata-garbha is not set in motion and turned round, 
the cessation of the seven evolving Vijnanas will never take
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place. WhyBecause, depending on the Alaya as the cause, 
the Vijnanas are evolved; because this is not within the reach 
of all Sravakas. Pratyekabuddhas, philosophers, and Yoga­
devotees; because [while] they understand that there is no ego­
substance in a person, they are [still] attached to ideas of 
singleness and generality as really existing in the Skandhas, 
Dhatus, and Ayatanas; the Tathagata-garbha is awakened and 
grows quiescent as one sees into what is meant by the five 
Dharmas, the [three] Natures, and the non-existence of the 
ego-substance in particular objects; and when there takes place 
the turning [in the Alaya] by gradually going up along the scales 
[of perfection, i.e., Dasabhumika], one will never be led astray 
by the methods and views held by the philosophers.......................
“The Tathagata-garbha is found united with the seven 
Vijnanas:
“From attachment a duality sets in, from knowledge it 
disappears:
“The Mind is to be regarded as mirror-like, perfumed by 
speculation [-habit] since beginningless [past] :
“When things are truly observed, they are not as they 
appear.
11 As the ignorant see the finger-tip and not the moon,
“So those who are addicted to letters understand not the 
thatness of things I teach.
“The Mind dances like the dancer, Manas resembles the 
jester [or companion actor],
“The Vijnana, in company with the five, imagines the 
visible [world] as the stage.”1
1 P. 220 ff.
The Function of Manas
The question may rise now, What is the significance of 
Manas? Cannot the other Vijnanas do without this one acting, 
as it were, between the Alaya and the other particularising six 
Vijnanas ? This seems to be quite a natural question, seeing that 
the Manovijnana can directly deal with the Alaya without 
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the interference of Manas. According to my way of interpret­
ing the Lankavatara, which may not be correct, the Alaya is 
a sort of universal consciousness, and Manas individual, em­
pirical consciousness. In the Alaya everything is stored, good 
and bad, in a state of quiescence and potentiality, but no 
discrimination, which latter, however, appears with the initiation 
of Manas. Manas is the active source of all the mental activities 
we ordinarily experience in this world of particulars. The 
possibility of eonsiousness lies in its dualistic nature, for without 
that which grasps (grahaka) and that which is grasped (grdhya), 
there will be no conscious life. The duality of subject and object 
is fundamental, but this dualism is impossible without assuming 
behind it something which is not dual. Therefore, at the back 
of the six Vijnanas there must be Manas, the principle of in­
dividuation, and also the Alaya, which goes even beyond the 
foundation of consciousness. When we admit that the six 
Vijnanas are fundamentally conditioned by the principle of 
individuation, we admit the existence of Manas. And when 
Manas is admitted, we inevitably go on to the Alaya which 
allows itself to be reflected by Manas as its condition and yet 
at the same time transcends it because the Alaya is not an 
individual object of experience but universal in its nature. And 
it is due to this universal nature of the Alaya that all the in­
dividual Manas are capable of reflecting one and the same 
universe and of engaging in discussion. The Alaya is thus most 
appropriately compared to the ocean.
This ocean of the Alaya is disturbed by the wind of the 
particularising principle, psychologically known as Manas and 
epistemologically as Vishaya. While Manas is conceptually 
separable from the other six Vijnanas, it is practically involved 
in them. In our psychological life itself the whole Vijnana 
system is engaged and we cannot very well talk individually of 
its components. So the Lankavatara is always careful to guard 
us from getting confused about this point: the Alaya and the 
Vijnanas are different and yet not-different, i.e., one; without 
the Alaya, the cause is lost and the whole mental apparatus 
collapses; and when that which makes the cause operative 
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ceases to get stirred up, the cause itself grows quiet though this 
does not mean its disappearance or destruction.
The Manas is the discriminating agency, but as this is pos­
sible only in the Alava, on which Manas with all its retinue of 
Vijiianas is dependent, the Manas and the Alaya are in the 
closest possible relationship. For this reason, the Alaya is 
dependent upon Manas to grow conscious of itself and of its 
unity. On the other hand, the six Vijiianas cannot function 
in harmony with one another unless Manas comes in between 
them and the Alaya. Manas is the connecting link. The posi­
tion occupied by Manas in the system of Vijiianas is thus pecu­
liarly complicated and apt to get confused sometimes with the 
Alaya and sometimes with Manovijiiana. In the Lankavatara, 
the Alaya is the reservoir of things good and bad, but it is 
perfectly neutral and not conscious of itself as there is yet no 
differentiation in it. This differentiation is caused by Manas, 
the defiling Vijnana as it is sometimes called. The differentia­
tion or defilement itself is neither good nor bad, but when this 
is adhered to as final, irreducible reality, there ensues the idea 
of an ego-substance internally and externally, and from this 
all evils are generated. As the result the mind loses its native 
transquillity. What is now most needed is to cause a revolution 
(paravritti) in the whole system of Vijiianas, especially in the 
Alaya itself, which, contaminated by Manas and Manovijiiana, 
has had its neutrality, purity, and innocence all departed from 
itself. To look into the matter squarely and clearly is called 
to see yathabhutam, which leads to emancipation and serenity.
The Awakening of Prajna.
How do we get now Prajna awakened in order to see into 
the true state of things, yathabhutam9. Where does this Prajfia 
come, and how do we attain self-realisation by directly experien­
cing the truth? And what is the truth? The sutra refers all 
the time to Prapanca (g^), Parikalpa (-gff-), Vikalpita 
Jglj), Abhinivesa (^,#), Bhranti (g£|g), Daushthulya 
Vasana (^^), etc., which are tossing up the roaring waves 
over the Alaya-ocean; but when does Pratyatmaryajnana get 
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its start so that the stormy sea will grow pacified and the world 
perceived without discrimination or disturbance of any kind? 
Says the sutra: “The Bodhisattva who aims to be great m his 
spiritual discipline is required to be perfect in the following four 
things: (1) He must have a penetrating comprehension (vibha- 
vana) as regards the nature of the manifestation of mind; (2) 
He must be free (vivarjana) from such notions as birth, abiding, 
and destruction; (3) He must observe (upalakshana) that ex­
ternal objects do not exist; and (4) He must get into (abhildk- 
shana) a state of realisation by directly seeing into the inmost 
self.”1 How could this be achieved?
1 Pp. 79-80.
If it were due to the coming in of the principle of particu- 
larisation or discrimination (vikalpa) that the Alaya ceases to 
be the seat of Tathagatahood, and if without this principle no 
sentient beings could ever come to the perception of the Alaya. 
even in its disturbed, distorted, and altogether false reflections, 
it must be again this principle that will set us aright in the 
position in order to have a correct view of Alaya. In other* 
words, if it were the work of Manas and Manovijnana that 
an external world came to be recognised as external, it must be 
their work again, properly executed this time, that we come to 
look at the world as having evolved out of our own being. 
Formerly, the Vijnana got wrongly attached to the principle 
of particularisation and thus to the undesirable part of the 
Vasana, memory, in the Alaya. There must be a turning of 
the waves, the course of Manas and Manovijnana must be 
altered towards the other direction than that which has been 
pursued hitherto. If they thought of the Alaya as external and 
subject to changes, they must now retrace their steps and look 
within themselves and see if there is anything that transcends 
the principle of particularisation. To transcend this principle, 
that is, for Manas and Manovijnana to transcend themselves, 
means the obliteration of themselves, their disappearance from 
the field of operation, the going beyond the dualism of grahya 
and grdhaka, of sat and asat, one and many, particularity and 
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universality. When this is accomplished, where do we find our­
selves? Where is the ultimate abiding place for us? This is 
the abode of Tathagatahood, and belongs to the realm of Alaya- 
vijnana to be known as Tathagata-garbha, and realisable only 
through immediate knowledge (pratyaksha) -1 For this no more 
belongs to the sphere of logic and analysis, but an experience 
immediately attained within oneself (pratyatma-gatigocara). 
A knowledge that is not of particularisation and discrimination, 
must be one of direct experience in which the Alaya reveals 
itself in its original purity and not in its distorted forms as 
it ordinarily does to the Vijnanas.
1 P. 222.
2 P. 133; see also p. 155.
When we thus come to have an immediate knowledge of 
transcendental nature, the Vijnana system ceases to be treated 
psychologically. We have now to go back to the chapter pre­
ceding this, where the so-called logical aspect of the inner 
experience is treated. The awakening of Prajna which is non- 
discriminative knowledge (nirvikalpajiiiT) beyond the realm of 
mentation (acmtya or acitta), is a practical question in the 
Lankavatara, and this will be treated in what follows.
PART III
Discipline in Dhyana
The logical and psychological equipment must be followed up 
by practical discipline without which the Bodhisattva could not 
be more than an idealistic philosopher. “As all the sacred doc­
trines leave no room from option and doubt, let the Bodhisattva 
retire into a solitude and reflect within himself by means of 
intelligence (buddhi) which lies in his inmost mind, and not be 
led by anybody else, when he will free himself from views based 
upon discrimination and by degrees advance towards the state 
of Tathagatahood.”1 2 This not depending on another is em­
phasised not only in Mahayana literature but in the Agamas 
THE LANKAVATARA SUTRA 279
Nikayas; for Buddhism is emphatically the doctrine of en­
lightenment which is to be realised within oneself. So, it is 
urged for the Bodhisattva who wishes to penetrate behind the 
screen of contrasts and dialectics that he should rid himself of 
all the hindrances (nivdranaj that may arise from noisy con­
fusion, from heaviness of mind, and from sleepiness, and also 
that he should assiduously engage in disciplining himself 
throughout the night, not at all mindful of the philosophies of 
other schools,1 including the Hinayanist.
1 Pp. 49, 99.
2 P. 49 f.
3 P. 100 ff.
Can the Bodhisattva, however, reach his goal by his own 
effort and without any outside assistance? Is there no “other 
power” that will come to his help ? Here we come to one of the 
features of Mahayana Buddhism distinguishing itself from the 
Hinayana. The Lankavritdru calls it the “Adhishthana of all the 
Buddhas which issues from their Pranidhana.”1 2 Without this 
Adhishthana on the part of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva with 
all his assiduity and penetrating insight may be incapable of 
realising the highest truth in himself and may not finally be 
taken up among the community of the Buddhas of the past, 
present, and future. Adhishthana {adhi+stha') means “basis,” 
“position,” “power,” etc., translated into Chinese by
“the pow’er that is added to and sustaining.” It is the power 
emanating from the will of the Buddha whose loving heart 
embraces the whole universe, and is added to that of a Bodhi­
sattva to sustain him, to encourage him, and finally to carry 
him over to a state of self- realisation. Not only in the present 
sutra but in other Mahayana sutras we frequently come across 
the sentence, “Through the Anubhava or Prabhava (that is, 
power) of the Buddha, a Bodhisattva rose from his seat and 
asked thus of the Buddha, or preached thus.” This is a 
form of authorisation, but in the ease of Adhishthana, it is 
more than that, for here the Buddha’s power sustains the 
Bodhisattva throughout his long laborious career of discipleship. 
Read the following :3
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“And. again, 0 Mahamati, sustained in two ways by the 
power (adliislittana) of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattva falls down 
at their feet and asks them to settle controversial points for 
him. What are the two ways? The one is the power by which the 
Bodhisattva is made to attain states of mental tranquillisation, 
and the other is that by which the Buddha personally appears 
before the Bodhisattva and anoints him with his own hands.
“ It is thus due to the power of the Buddha that the Bodhi­
sattva at the first stage attains the Samadhi known as the 
Light of the Mahayana, and that having attained this Samadhi 
the Bodhisattva finds himself now blessed by the personal pres­
ence of all the Buddhas from the ten quarters who will with 
their own body and speech add their power upon him. It is 
like the case with the Bodhisattva Vajragarbha and others who 
are furnished with all these meritorious attributes.
‘ ‘ 0 Mahamati, in this wise the Bodhisattva at the first stage 
gets sustained by the power of the Buddhas in his attainment 
of the states of tranquillisation. In virtue of a stock of merit 
accumulated for hundreds of thousands of kalpas, he will in 
succession go up the stages, and qualifying himself with the 
virtues of perfect control, reach the stage of Bodhisattvahood 
called Dharmamegha (Cloud of the Law). Seating himself on 
a throne in the Palace of the Great Lotus, he is surrounded by 
Bodhisattvas like himself and wears a tiara adorned and em­
bellished with all kinds of jewels. The Buddhas will now come 
from all the ten quarters of the universe, who are shining like 
the brilliant full-moon with yellowish, golden, champ aka-like 
rays, and with their lotus-like hands anoint the forehead of the 
Bodhisattva seated on the throne in the lotus palace. He is 
like the crown-prince of a great sovereign, who, being thus 
anointed by the Buddhas personally with their own hands, 
assume full power. This Bodhisattva and such others are said 
to be sustained, thus hand-anointed, by the power of the Buddhas. 
These are the two ways in which the Bodhisattva is sustained by 
the power of the Buddha; and when he is thus sustained he will 
see all the Buddhas face to face. In no other way, the Tatha- 
gatas, Arhats, the Fully-Enlightened Ones are to be seen.
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“Ancl again, 0 Mahamati, whatever the Bodhisattva ac­
complishes in the way of Samadhi, psychic attainments, or 
preaching, is thus done by being sustained in two ways by the 
power of the Buddhas. If the Bodhisattva could at all preach 
intelligently without being sustained by the power of the Bud­
dhas, the ignorant would also preach intelligently. Why? The 
question hangs on whether or not one is sustained by the 
Buddhas’ power. Being sustained by the entrance of the Tatha- 
gata into them, [the whole universe with its] grasses, shrubs, 
trees, ancl even mountains, ancl also [with its] musical instru­
ments of all kinds, utensils, towns, dwellings, palaces, ancl 
seats,—all will play music. How much more so with conscious 
beings! The cleaf, blind, ancl mute will be emancipated from 
their defects. Suchwise is the power of the Tathagata, so dis­
tinctive, ancl so full of great virtues.
“Mahamati asked, Why do the Tathagatas sustain the 
Bodhisattva, by their power when he abides in his states of 
tranquillisation as well as when he is at the superior stage? 
Said the Blessed One: It is to keep him away from the evil one 
ancl from evil passions, it is to let him not fall into the Dhyana 
ancl stage of the Sravakas, but to make him attain to the self­
realisation of the Tathagata-stage ancl grow in the virtues 
already acquired by him. For this reason, the Bodhisattva is 
sustained by the power of all the Tathagatas. 0 Mahamati, if 
he is not thus sustained he may fall into the way of thinking 
as cherished by bacl philosophers, Sravakas, ancl the evil one, 
ancl will not be enlightened in the Supreme Enlightenment. 
For this reason, the Bodhisattva is favoured by the Tathagatas 
who are Arhats ancl Fully-Enlightenecl Ones.”1
1 Pp. 100-103, abstract.
The conception of Pranidhana which is usually translated 
or simply “vow,” is again peculiar to the Mahayana. 
A Bodhisattva generally makes a number of vows before he 
begins his career as a worlcl-teacher; for his desire to realise 
the final stage of Bucldhahoocl is not for his own benefit but for 
the whole world. The forty-eight vows of Dharmakara are one 
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of such cases, who became Amitabha Buddha the world-saviour 
when his vows were all fulfilled. But, generally speaking, the 
Bodhisattva’s universal vow or prayer is that all his fellow­
beings, inclusive even of non-sentient beings, sooner or later, 
attain to the supreme enlightenment of the Buddha, and his 
work towards this end never ceases. The Lankavatara does not 
tell us so much about awakening the thought of enlightenment, 
(boclhi-citta-utpacin'),—in fact I think there is not one reference 
to this idea; when Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi is mentioned, it 
refers to its attainment and not to the awakening of thought 
towards it. But in the Prajnd-pdramitd Sutras and others this 
awakening is constantly spoken of as the first step towards gain­
ing access to the final truth of Tathagatahood. The Lankava­
tara, however, describes the Buddha’s part in the purification of 
the hearts or minds of all beings by raising a question as to the 
time needed for the work. Mahamati asks, “Is the cleansing 
effected by the Buddha instantaneous or gradual—-the cleans­
ing of all beings from the out-flowings (or disturbances) of the 
Mind (svacitta-drisija-dhdrd) ‘I ” To this the Buddha gives the 
following answer, according to which his cleansing takes effect 
sometimes instantaneously, sometimes gradually.1 The word 
“sometimes” is missing in the passage quoted, but we have I 
think to supply it in order to make the sense not too glaringly 
contradictory. In fact, the reading of the Lankdvatdra is no 
easy task as I remarked in the beginning of this paper, and in 
many cases varied interpretations are possible.1 2
1 Mainly after tlie T'ang version. Cf. pp. oo-uG, Nanjio edition.
2 There is no doubt that the sutra makes no pretensions to a system.
Mahamati asked, “When the mind is cleaned of its own 
flow of external manifestations, is it done all at once or by 
degrees?” Said the Buddha: “The cleansing is done by 
degrees, not all at once. It is like the ripening of the anira 
fruit which takes place gradually and not at once. It is again 
like the potter’s making pots, it is done gradually and not at 
once. The Tathagata’s cleansing of all beings of their minds 
from which external manifestations flow, is carried out by 
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degrees and not all at once. It is again like the shooting of 
grass, shrub, herb, or a thicket on earth, it is gradual and not 
at once; so does the Tathagata cleanse all beings of their mental 
outflows. It is again like one’s learning the arts of dancing, 
singing, writing, playing the lute, etc.; it is mastered by degrees 
and not all at once: so does the Tathagata his cleansing work.
“[But sometimes the cleansing is done at once and not 
by degrees] as in the case of the mirror’s reflecting all forms 
simultaneously and without discrimination. In a similar way, 
the Tathagata cleanses the minds of all beings from their out­
flowing manifestations, making them at once pure and free from 
discrimination and leading them to a state of no-images. Again, 
as the sun or the moon illumines all forms and appearances at 
once with its beams of light, so does the Tathagata reveal at 
once the spiritual state of Buddhahood which is the object of 
intuitive knowledge (acintyajildna') by befreeing all beings of 
their self-imagined manifestations, errors, and habit-energy 
(vdsanad). Again, as the Alaya-vijnana reveals simultaneously 
an external world of individual objects as manifestations of 
one’s own mind, so the Nishyanda-Buddha,1 at once maturing 
all beings, enables them to discipline themselves as religious 
devotees at their abodes in the celestial palace of Akanishtha. 
Again, as the Dharmata-Buddha shines instantly with the light 
of the Nishyanda-Buddha and the Nirmana-Buddha, so does the 
inner realisation of the ultimate truth shine forth all at once, 
going beyond the wrong views based upon ideas of being and 
not-being. ”
1 For the explanation of this see supra.
T/ie Will-body (manomayakaya)
No definite statement of the Triple Body dogma is found 
in the Lankdvatdra, but all the component ideas seem to be 
present as is recognisable here: Dharmata-Buddha, Nishyanda- 
Buddha. and Nirmana-Buddha, which apparently correspond 
to the later trinity of Dharma-kaya, Sambhoga-kaya, and Nir- 
mana-kaya. It may be interesting to discuss here the development 
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of the dogma if the author was not going to restrict himself 
to such topics in the Lankavatara as are more or less directly 
connected with the absolute idealism developed in the sutra and 
with the intuitive knowledge of the truth which is its principal 
theme—these being the foundation of Zen Buddhism. He wishes, 
however, to touch upon the idea of Nirmana-Buddha as it is 
closely related to that of Pranidhana, the Bodhisattva’s vow. 
Being thoroughly idealistic, whatever is most vehemently desired 
by the Buddha or Bodhisattva whose interest extends over the 
whole field of beings, must take effect in one way or another in 
this world even of our ordinary life. To have, however, a wish 
carried out successfully, one may have frequently to step over 
the limitations of this physical body, which is tied to space-time 
relations. A body not so limited wt.11 be needed in this ease,— 
a body that can be manifested anywhere and at any time as 
is wished. The Buddha or Bodhisattva has this body known as 
Manomayakaya, which means “mind-made-body,” or simply 
“will-body.”
The definition of Manomayakaya oi’ </£»> ac­
cording to the Lankavatara, is this: “By manomaya [‘as 
willed’] it is meant to move about so speedily and unobstructedly 
as one wills. Like the mind that moves unobstructedly over 
mountains, walls, rivers, trees, and other objects, even beyond 
many hundreds of thousands of yojanas, by merely thinking 
of objects seen and perceived previously, wTith its own thought 
continuously and uninterruptedly working regardless of the 
limitations of the body; so when the Manomayakaya is obtained 
in the realisation of the Samadhi known as Mayopama [Maya- 
like], he acquires the ten powers (bala) the tenfold self-mastery 
(vasita,'), and the six psychic faculties [abhijndna), is adorned 
w’ith the distinguishing marks, and born among the family of 
Holy Path, and, thinking of the objects of his original vow 
which is to bring all beings to full maturity, moves about as 
unobstructedly as the mind moves on.”1
1 Cf. p. SI.
The three kinds of Manomayakaya (“will-body”) is dis­
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tinguished in the Lankavatdra, somewhat foreshadowing the 
later systematisation of the Triple Body dogma: The three are 
(1) the will-body attainable in the bliss of Samadhi, (2) the 
will-body that has the knowledge of the self-nature of the 
Dharma, and (3) the will-body whose deeds are not caleulative, 
being born among the order of holy ones. The first kind is 
the product of a perfect mental control which takes place as the 
Bodhisattva goes up through the third, the fourth, and the 
fifth stage of spiritual discipline, and realises that the mind 
in its true nature is above its evolved Vijnanas and seeing into 
the phenomenality of objects is tranquil like the ocean undis­
turbed by the waves. The second form comes from a deep 
penetration into the truth of all things, which is enjoyed by 
the Bodhisattva above the eighth stage; for as he perceives that 
all things being mere appearances are like maya and lion-entities, 
there takes place a turning in the recesses of his consciousness, 
and he enters into the Samadhi called Mayopama and then into 
other Samadhis; he is now adorned with flowers, with various 
attributes such as the tenfold self-mastery and the six psychic 
faculties, moves as quickly as thought itself, and the body 
attained now is like lunar reflection in water or an image in the 
mirror or a vision in a dream, it is not made of the four elements 
and yet resembles one so made, it is furnished with all the parts 
of the material body; he will now enter into all the Buddha- 
lands, their circles and assemblies. As he has thus perfectly 
penetrated into the nature of the Dharma, he has the second 
form of the will-body. The third will-body comes from deeply 
experiencing the bliss and character of the inner realisation 
enjoyed by all Buddhas.1,1
The inner realisation (pratyatmadTiarmd) here referred to 
is a common property of all the Buddhas, and when a Bodhi­
sattva obtains this insight into his inmost being, he has thereby 
obtained the passport into the spiritual community of all the 
Buddhas, past, present and future. If a critic insists that this 
subjectivism ought to be verified objectively, i.e., must have some 
1 Pp. 136-137, abstract.
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objective ground on which the experience is to be set up, the 
Lankavatara says that there is what is to be called Pauranas- 
thiti-dharmata, something that has been in existence from the 
timeless past, or thingness that abides eternally in things, or an 
absolute reality that exists regardless of the appearance or non- 
appearance of the Buddhas. This reality exists in the world 
as gold exists concealed in the ore, for it is this that makes things 
abide, makes them arrange themselves in order and establish 
a realm among themselves, and constitutes their essence. It is 
eternally there. It is the suchness of things.1
1 P. 143.
2 See also above.
3 P. 144.
4 P. 241.
Therefore, when the Bodhisattvas or Buddhas attain to the 
realisation, the experience is not something altogether new to 
them. It is an old story, as it were. It is like walking in an 
old city which one happens to discover in the midst of the 
desert. The streets are smoothly paved as ever. One enters 
into it, and quietly enjoys a peaceful life. The Buddha did 
not create these things, they have been there from the beginning. 
The Dharma he has an insight into is something enduring 
(clharmasthitita'), a regulative principle (dharmaniyamata), and 
suchness of things (tatJiatd), reality (bhiitatd), truth (satyata). 
And it was for this reason that the Buddha declared that ever 
since his enlightenment night he had not uttered a word.1 2 This 
is indeed, according to the Lankavatara, the esoteric teaching 
(samclhaya) or Buddhism.3
The conception of Pauranasthitidharmata, or Purvadliarma- 
sthitita4is the doctrine of universal Alaya-vijnana, ontologically 
stated. The Pratyatmagati consists in realising this originally- 
abiding Dharma, which is variously described as Tathagata- 
garbha, the Alaya, suchness of things, which is beyond the signs 
of speech, analysis, and description, and in which all the Bud­
dhas, Bodhisattvas, and sentient beings get united, have an ever­
enduring community—Nirvana. But the function of the Bod­
hisattva is not to stay forever in this happy society but to come 
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all the roots of merit and do not enter into Nirvana. The second 
group is that of the Bodhisattva, who wishing to lead all beings 
to Nirvana denies himself this bliss. He vowed in the beginning 
of his religious career that until every one of his fellow-beings 
is led to enjoy the eternal happiness of Nirvana he himself would 
not leave this world of pain and suffering, but must strenuously 
and with every possible means (updya) work towards the com­
pletion of his mission. But as there will be no termination of 
life as long as the universe continues to exist, the Bodhisattva 
may have no chance for ever to rest himself quietly with his 
work finished in the serenity of Nirvana. The time will come even 
to those evil speakers of the Bodhisattvayana when through the 
power (adhishthdncr) of the Buddhas they finally embrace the 
Mahayana and by amassing stock of merit enter into Nirvana, for 
the Buddhas are always working for the benefit of all beings no 
matter what they are. But as for the Bodhisattva he never 
enters into Nirvana as he has a deep insight into the nature of 
things which are already in Nirvana even as they are. ffBodhi- 
sattvecchttntiko ’tra mahdmate ddipcirinirvritdn-sarva-dharnidn- 
■viditva-at yantato na parinirvdti') -1
1 P. 66.
2 P. 123: see also p. 214.
Thus we know where the Bodhisattva stands in his never- 
ending task of leading all beings into the final abode of rest. 
So, says the sutra: “He will through his ten never-ending 
vows bring all beings to maturity, and, manifesting himself in 
various forms in response to the needs of all beings, will never 
know where to rest from his task; and yet his mind is always 
abiding in the state of self-realisation and in the enjoyment of 
perfect meditation. ’ ’1 2
The Bodhisattva’s Vows and His Effortless Works
According to his transcendental insight into the truth of 
things, the Bodhisattva knows that it is beyond all predicates 
and altogether not subject to any form of description, but his 
heart full of Karuna (love) for all beings who are unable to 
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step out of the dualistic whirlpools of sat and asat, he directs 
his intense vows towards their salvation and emancipation. 
His own heart is free from such attachments as are ordinarily 
cherished by the unemancipated, but that which feels is here 
after all, his insight has not destroyed this, and hence his 
Purvapranidhana, his Upayakaushalya, his Nirmana-kaya. Yet 
all that he does for the maturity (paripocana) of all beings in 
response to their needs, is like the lunar reflection in water 
(jalacanclravat) / showing himself in all forms and appearances 
he preaches to them on the Dharma. His activity is what is in 
Mahayana phraseology called Anabhogacarya, deeds that are 
effortless, effectless, and purposeless, which correspond to the 
Christian love of God.
When the Bodhisattva enters upon the first stage called Joy, 
Pramudita, in the career of his spiritual discipline, he makes 
the following solemn vows, Pranidhana, ten in number, which, 
flowing out of his most earnest determined will, are as all- 
inclusive as the whole universe, extending to the extremity o'f 
space itself, reaching the end of time, exhausting all the number 
of kalpas (ages), and functioning uninterruptedly as long as 
there is the appearance of a Buddha. The first is to honour and 
serve all the Buddhas, one and all, without a single exception; 
the second is to work for the preservation and perpetuation of 
the teaching of all the Buddhas: the third is to be present at 
the appearance of each Buddha, wherever and whenever it may 
be; the fourth is to practise the proper conduct of Bodhisattva­
hood which is wide and measureless, imperishable and free from 
impurities, and to extend the virtues of perfection towards all 
beings; the fifth is to induce all beings in the most comprehen­
sive sense of the term to the teaching of the Buddhas so that 
they will find their final abode of peace in the wisdom of the 
all-wise ones; the sixth is to have an inner perception of the 
universe, wide and inexhaustible, in all its possible multitudi­
nousness ; the seventh is to realise the most closely interpenetrat­
ing relationship of each and all, of all and each, and to make 
1 P. 227, p. 193, etc.
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every land of beings as immaculate as a Buddha-land; the 
eighth is to be united with all the Bodhisattvas in oneness of 
intention, to get intimately acquainted with the dignity, under­
standing, and psychic condition of the Tathagatas, so that he 
can enter any society of beings and accomplish the Mahayana 
which is beyond thought; the ninth is to evolve the never-reced­
ing wheel whereby to carry out his work of universal salvation, 
by making himself like unto the great lord of medicine or the 
wish-fulfilling gem; and lastly, the tenth is to realise the great 
supreme enlightenment in all the worlds, by going through the 
stages of Buddhahood, and to gratify the wishes of all beings with 
one voice, and while showing himself to be in Nirvana, not to 
cease from practising objects of Bodhisattvahood.1
1 This is a mere abstract. For details see the Dasaoliumika-sutra, 
edited by J. Rahder, pp. 14-16. Also cf. the Siksha-samuccaya, translated 
into English by E. Bendall and H. W. D. Rouse, pp. 265-268. Quite in­
teresting it is to compare the English version with the various Chinese 
translations of the Dasabliumika sutra as an independent text and also as 
one of the chapters in the Avatamsalca sutra.
These ten vows or prayers made by the Bodhisattva at the 
beginning of his spiritual career, that is, when he has entered 
upon the first stage of Bodhisattvahood or rather Buddhist life, 
called Pramuclita, do not quite describe the inner consciousness 
of the Bodhisattva in its deepest signification; for he has not 
yet entered a stage of Anabhoga-carya where all his conscious 
efforts are dropped and he moves about as the sun shines on 
the unjust as well as on the just, or as the moon in water. 
While a great compassionate heart (mahakaruna) is always the 
most powerful driving force throughout his spiritual progress, 
he may not attain to a higher stage unless his heart transcends 
dualism and his behaviour leaves no taint of discrimination 
(vikalpa). Up to the seventh stage (called Duramgama) of 
Buddhist life, the Bodhisattva has not been free from the sense 
of making effort for the attainment of a certain definite object, 
he has so far always been conscious of strain and strenuosity, 
he has been making a definite attempt at accomplishing some­
thing, at bringing forth some tangible result as the outcome of 
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his labour. But lie has now completed this part of his work, 
he has now graduated, so to speak, from an effortful life (pra- 
yogicarya'), he is now on the way to a life of Anabhogacarya, 
where no efforts are made, no consciousness of strain is left 
though he is far from being a sleepy lithargic good-for-nothing 
fellow now.1
1 Of. Bahtier, p. 57.
2 Of. Rahder, p. 58.
So we read in the Avatamsaka sutra, or in the Dasabhil- 
mika sutra,1 that up to the seventh stage the Bodhisattva has 
been trying not to be affected or contaminated by a life of evil 
passions (Jclesa'), but-has not yet been able to go beyond it 
(samatikrarn). He is like a great king who goes around riding 
on a fine elephant. He knows thus that there are many poverty- 
stricken people in his country, but he himself has no fear of 
getting mixed among these unhappy creatures. He is quite free 
indeed from such contamination, but he cannot be said to be 
a super-man who has passed beyond the frailty of a mortal 
being. He can attain to this transcendental state only by aban­
doning his kingly position and being born in the Brahman world, 
where, enveloped in the celestial light, he looks down at thou­
sands of worlds and freely walks through them. The Bodhi­
sattva, up to the seventh stage, has gone through the world 
riding in the carriage of the Paramitas, virtues of perfection, 
and due to these virtues he lias been kept away from the con­
tamination of this world though he knows well that there are 
defiled lives enough here. But he cannot be called yet to be 
one who lias gone altogether beyond evil passions and deeds 
following them. If, however, he abandons all his conscious 
strivings or purposeful efforts, that is, if he finally passes from 
the seventh to the eighth stage, and, riding in the Bodhisattva’s 
carriage of immaculacy, walks through the world, free from con­
taminations, he is really the one who has altogether gone beyond.
When thus the Bodhisattva, discarding all effortful works 
(sarvabhogavigata,}, attains to the effortless state of conscious­
ness, he enters upon the eighth stage known as Acala, the 12
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Immovable. But we must remember that effortlessness is the 
outcome of intense efforts, and that when the former is not 
preceded by the latter, it will never be realised, Says the 
Vaxdbhilniika-,1 It is like a man who in a dream finds himself 
drowning in a river; he musters all his courage and is deter­
mined at all costs to get out of it. And because of these very 
efforts and desperate contrivances he is awakened from the 
dream, and when thus awakened he at once perceives that no 
further doings are needed now. So with the Bodhisattva: just 
because of the great determination and the great strivings that 
he has put forward in order to save all beings from getting 
drowned in the river of ignorance and confusion, he has at last 
reached the eighth stage, and once here all his conscious efforts 
are set aside, his perception is not obstructed by dualistic con­
siderations, nor by appearances.
1 Rahder, p. 6-1.
2 Rahder, p. 67.
3 Rahder, p. 63 f.
This effortlessness is again compared in the Dasalihumika? 
to a great seafaring boat. When the boat is not yet at sea, 
much labour is needed to make it move forward. But as soon 
as it gets out in the ocean, no human power is required; just 
let alone and the wind will take care of it. One day’s navigation 
thus left to itself at high sea will surely be more than equal 
to one hundred years’ human belabouring while still on the 
shallows.’ When the Bodhisattva accumulating the great stock 
of good deeds sails out in the great ocean of Bodhisattvahood, 
one moment of his effortless activity infinitely surpasses deeds 
of conscious striving.
By these analogies, the reader will be able to form some 
idea as to the significance in Buddhism of a life of effortlessness. 
When the Bodhisattva reaches this stage of Buddhist life he is 
said to be standing on the stage of immovability (acaZa), for 
he has now realised Anutpattika-dharma-kshanti. This is de­
fined in the following terms in the Dasabhumika1 23 showing where 
is the spiritual background of Anabhoga-carya, which is really 
the quintessence of Bodhisattvahood:
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“The Bodhisattva Vajragarbha said, 0 venerable sir, son 
of the Buddha, when, the Bodhisattva, while at the seventh stage, 
has thoroughly finished examining what is meant by the knowl­
edge of the means (updyajndna), has well cleansed the paths, 
has accumulated all the preparatory material, has well equipped 
himself with the vows, and is sustained by the power of the 
Tathagatas, procuring in himself the power produced from the 
stock of merit, attentively thinking of and in conformity with the 
powers, convictions, and unique characteristics of the Tathagata, 
thoroughly purified, sincere in heart, and thoughtful, elevated in 
virtue, knowledge, and power, great in pity and compassion 
which leaves no sentient beings unnoticed, and in pursuit of 
the path of wisdom that is beyond measurement; and, further, 
when he enters, truly, as it is, upon the knowledge that all 
things are, in their nature, from the first, unborn (anutpanna), 
unproduced (ajdta), devoid of individualising marks (alak- 
shana), have never been combined (asambhuta), are never dis­
solved (avindsita), nor extinguished (anishthita'), nor changing 
(apravritti), nor ceasing (anabhinivritti), and are lacking in 
self-substance (abhdvasvabhdva) ; the knowledge that they re­
main the same in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, 
are of suchness, non-discriminative, and entering into the knowl­
edge of the all-knowing one, [and finally] when he thus enters 
upon the knowledge of all things as they really are, he gets 
himself completely free from such individualising ideas as are 
created by the mind (citta) .and its agent (manovijnana) ; he 
is as detached as the sky, and descends upon all objects as if 
upon an empty space; he is then said to have attained to the ac­
ceptance of all things as unborn (amctpattika-clharma-kshanti)
This may seem from the point of view of ordinary termi­
nology almost too abstract, too metaphysical, but to those who 
are well acquainted with the Mahavanistic way of thinking and 
feeling, the definition of Anutpattika-dharma-kshanti here 
quoted from the Dasabhumika is exact and adequately describes 
the highest object of Buddhist life as far as this kind of phrase­
ology allows. In the Lankdvatdra, the same ideas are more 
concretely expressed from another angle by means of an analogy.
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though tlie sutra says that such analogies do not do justice to 
the true state of affairs. The truth as intuitively seen by the 
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas surpasses all symbolism and beyond 
the understanding of the ordinary mind, but when some indica­
tions are not given, the truth may forever be kept away from us, 
perhaps worse than that, will be vilified and denunciated to 
our own spiritual ruination. The analogy has already1 been 
quoted when Tatliagatahood was compared to the sands of the 
Ganga.
There are some other important points in the Lankavatara 
to which I wish to refer if this paper were intended to exhaust 
the sutra even as one of the principal Mahayana texts, but my 
object has been from the start to treat it as most intimately 
connected with Zen Buddhism, and, therefore, as containing 
some of the most salient ideas of Zen. Therefore, I opened this 
article with an account of Pratyatmagatigocara which forms the 
central thesis of the Lankavatara and also the object of Zen 
discipline. No doubt, all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism 
(and for that matter the Ilinayana too) aim at gaining an 
immediate personal insight into the essence of Buddhahood, but 
this aspect of Buddhist life I find more clearly and emphatically 
and straightforwardly brought out in the Lankavatara than any 
other sutras. But as all religion requires a philosophical back­
ground without which it limps, I have tried to show how the 
Lankavatara gives a logical and a psychological account of the 
inmost experience called throughout the sutra Pratyatmaryaj- 
iianagocara. With this the theoretical side of Zen Buddhism 
finishes while its active side is to be developed if it has to bear 
fruit in this practical life. Hence towards the end of this paper 
I have tried to describe the disciplinary life of the Buddhist 
as presented in the sutra.
Buddhist nomenclature is frequently too intellectual and 
the Indians have their own peculiar way of presenting their 
ideas; and for this reason one is apt to regard the Mahayana as
1 See page 241 et seq. of this magazine.
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a philosophy too abstract ancl too high-flying and not at all 
religions; but the .fact is that the Mahayana stands on two legs, 
Prajna and Karuiia, transcendental idealism and all-embracing- 
affection for all kinds of beings, animate as well as inanimate. 
The former sees into the unity of things, and the latter the 
diversity. The Bodhisattva weeps with suffering beings and at 
the same time realises that there is one that never weeps, being- 
above sufferings, tribulations, and contaminations. Buddhist 
life finds its perfect realisation in a harmonious blending of the 
two terms: philosophically, the one and the many, sat and asat; 
religiously the pure and the defiled. And this balancing is 
found in the Bodhisattva’s Pranidhana or vow. “There are two 
worlds, the defiled and the immaculate, and between the two there 
is no way to cross from the one to the other, except by means 
of the Bodhisattva’s great vow, knowledge of means {upuya- 
prajiiif), and the power of psychic penetration.”1
1 The Dasabliiimika Sutra. Cf. Rahder, p. 58.
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